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Abstract 
One of the problems on the public agenda is the question of the status of 
the non-Jewish minority in the State of Israel.  Debate and public 
discussion of these questions is ancient, although it has increased in times 
of national, social and political crisis. 
The continuing crisis of Israeli democracy and the existing decades' old 
conflict with Arab States and the Palestinians have made these questions 
stand out, regarding all Israeli citizens, the loyalty of the minority to the 
State, and equal rights and obligations.  The educational system of non-
Jewish schools must cope with these difficult questions within school 
walls and in civics classes. 
Sometimes, and particularly when discussing rights versus obligations, a 
question arises among the Druze regarding their level of identification 
with the State and their willingness to contribute and volunteer, even at 
risk of death among Druze youths, despite the lack of civic equal rights. 
Over the past sixty years of statehood, the policies of Israeli governments 
towards the Druze have been typified by a desire to expand the lines 
dividing between the Druze and the Moslems.  The idea of developing a 
unique identity among the Druze was at the basis of the Zionist policy 
towards the Druze. 
Based on the fact that the Druze, unlike the Arabs, have tied their fate to 
the future of the State, and are full partners in defending the State's 
security, political leaders have consolidated a unique policy towards the 
Druze sector, different than the policy towards Israeli Arabs.  This is 
expressed  clearly  regarding  recruitment  to  the IDF  and  cultivating  the 
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 Druze national identity through official recognition of the Druze as an 
independent ethnic sect, creating a separate educational network for the 
Druze. 
These decisions regarding application of equality between Druze and 
Jews, and integration of the Druze in Israeli society have led to many 
expectations among the Druze, and many disappointments.  Many 
problems have not been resolved, and some have even gotten worse.  
Among the Druze, much frustration has developed because of the fact that 
they fulfill all their obligations to the State, but do not receive their full 
rights. 
Therefore, often the question has arisen:  Have changes occurred in 
youths' motivation to serve in the army and in their Druze and Israeli 
identity? 
The present dissertation will address this question by presenting  a 
questionnaire to a sample of 100 Druze 12th grade students learning in a 
Druze school and in a mixed Druze school, regarding their perception of 
the Israeli-Arab conflict and the peace process, motivation to serve in the 
IDF, democratic Druze values and national identity.
The research methodology at the basis of this study was quantitative, and 
examination of differences between groups was conducted using T tests 
and correlations between variables. 
The aim of the present dissertation is to learn about and examine 
perceptions of Druze youth in Israel regarding the IDF, democracy and 
Druze values. 
The questionnaire included questions in the following areas:  Perception 
of the Israeli-Arab conflict and the peace process; attitudes towards 
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service and volunteering for the State; the strength of Druze identity and  
faith. 
It was hypothesized that within the framework of the peace process, that a 
difference would be found between the perceptions of Druze students in 
the Druze school and those in the mixed school regarding the Israeli-Arab 
conflict and the peace process. 
It was also hypothesized based on the social contact theory, that as a result 
of exposure of Druze students in a mixed school to the Arab population 
which does not serve in the IDF, this would affect their level of 
identification with the State and their motivation to volunteer and 
contribute to the State. 
It was also hypothesized that within the framework of principles of Druze 
faith, that a correlation exists between belief in Druze tenets and between 
volunteering for volunteer units at risk to life. 
The first research hypothesis was proven. The social contact hypothesis 
was partially supported, and the Druze belief hypothesis was also partially 
supported. 
The research findings showed that there are significant differences 
between the attitudes of Druze students learning in a Druze school and 
those of students in a mixed school.  The research results are 
comprehensive and complex.  More detailed attention to the findings is 
provided in the body of the dissertation, but a number of points are clearly 
indicated: 
1. Despite the frustration and lack of equal rights for Druze in 
Israel, the sense of being Israeli and belief in the State among 
Druze students is high. 
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2. Druze youth perceive the IDF positively, particularly 
becoming an officer, which is considered to be part social 
standing, and career military service, considered a source of 
income. 
3. Schools and educational curricula are relatively unimportant. 
The present research and its findings are important and include 
recommendations for future research.  The dissertation allows learning 
about the perceptions of Druze students regarding military service, the 
components of Druze identity, and Druze values. 
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Introduction 
The State of Israel is presently going through changes related to the peace 
process with its neighbors, and as expected, the peace process involves 
ups and downs. 
The negotiations regarding peace are accompanied by terror attacks and 
victims, and lead to doubts regarding the nature of the agreement which 
Israel has signed.  Peace and the dangers that are involved have become 
doubly important as we consider security in our lives. 
Israeli youths play an important part in carrying the security burden.  
Youths are also the next generation and the future of the State.  Therefore 
it is very important to understand the attitudes of youth and their values 
regarding security, peace and society. 
Since the establishment of the State of Israel, the vast majority of Druse 
youth aged 18 has been recruited into the army and has served their three 
years in compulsory service. 
The security and existence of the State of Israel depend on the willingness 
of Jewish and Druze youths to serve in the army, and when necessary to 
give of themselves for the defense of the State and its residents.  The 
Druze youths fulfill their duties and expect the State to grant them their 
full rights just like those of Jewish residents of the country. 
The existence of the Druze minority in Israel has created many security, 
legal, social and moral dilemmas for the government since the inception 
of the State.  It has been a moral, social and security challenge to decide 
on the status of the Druze minority in a Jewish state, and if they should be 
treated   differently   than   other   minorities.   In   Israel's  declaration  of  
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independence , it is stated that Israel is a  democratic  state and  maintains  
equal social rights for all citizens, no matter what religion, race or gender. 
The security of the State and its existence depends on the willingness of 
Jewish and Druze youths to volunteer to serve in the IDF, and when 
necessary give of themselves and contribute on behalf of the State. 
But often, a question arises regarding level of identification with the State 
and willingness to contribute and volunteer at risk to life, among Druze 
youths, despite the lack of equality in civic rights. 
The Jewish nation living as a minority throughout the world struggles for 
equal rights, and now is in the opposite situation, when it is a majority in 
its own independent country, within which live minorities whose 
identification with the State is not a given fact. 
Based on recent security events within Israel, the terror attacks, the 
Intifada and wars, and on the other hand, the bitterness and feelings of 
discrimination among the Druze as a result of lack of equal rights, the 
question regarding the level of motivation of Druze youth to volunteer for 
the IDF and contribute to the  State arises.  Have changes occurred in this 
motivation in the past years, particularly recently based on the Second 
Lebanon War which hit the Israeli home front hard? 
The aim of the present dissertation is to learn about and examine the 
perceptions and attitudes of Druze students regarding the security of  the 
State, peace and values. 
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The Literature Review 
1. Majority-Minority Relations in Pluralistic States 
Minorities of all types: cultural, religious, linguistic, and racial, exist 
throughout the world (Griessman, 1975; I'ylon, 1979).  In almost every 
country in the world there is at least one minority group (Lijphart, 1980).  
From among all of the independent countries that existed in 1973, 90% of 
them had at least one minority group (Smooh, 1976).  Of  the 18 countries 
of the Mediterranean Basin, 13 counties are multi-ethnic, and all together 
contain 55 ethnic groups (Kliot, 1989). 
One fifth to a quarter of all the residents of the Middle East belong to a 
minority group characterized by different ethnic and national origins, 
separate religious belonging, different customs, languages, dialects or 
special ceremonies (Olmert, 1986).  The world contains different types of 
minorities, and there is no single unequivocal definition for the term 
minority (Wirsing, 1981).  Simpson & Yinger (1985)  define minority as 
a group of people who have cultural attributes different from those of 
others living together with them within the same society, and who 
consider themselves a different group. 
Hepburn (1979) defines minority as a non-dominant group within the 
population which aims to maintain its ethnic, religious, linguistic, or 
traditional attributes, setting it apart from the rest of the population.  
Banton (1972) defines a minority as a special group of people that 
composes less than half of the population.  Wagley & Harris (1958) 
defined minority as a group of people that is inferior from a status 
standpoint, and subordinate to the larger group, characterized by special 
cultural attributes perceived as less respected by the dominant social 
group. 
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Almost all societies throughout the world are pluralistic societies.  
Pluralism is generally expressed in cultural variety between ethnic 
groups, inequality, social status gaps, and disparities in division of power 
and resources among different groups, a lack of cohesion and a lack of 
solidarity and cooperation between groups (Smooha, 1976).  These 
attributes are repressive and affect relations between minority groups and 
the ruling majority, making these relationships problematic, and full of 
hatred, suspicion and the potential for violence.  They create political and 
moral problem on both the local and international planes.  Conflicts 
stemming from ethnic plurality are difficult to cope with, and their 
severity is a great threat to the territorial wholeness of the state (Muir & 
Paddison, 1981). 
Minority problems have existed throughout history, beginning with the 
problems of the Jews in ancient Egypt (Hepburn, 1979).  Minorities play 
varied roles, and use different strategies to solve their problems.  Barron 
(1967) divided minorities into four groups based on their goals: 
1. Pluralistic Minorities have pluralistic goals and they demand 
tolerance on the part of the dominant group.  The Druze in 
Israel belong to this group. 
2. Assimilationist Minorities aim mainly to assimilate.  They 
would like to be fully included in the life of the larger group. 
3. Secessionist Minorities, aim to secede from society and 
achieve political independence from the dominant group. 
4. Militant Minorities, aim to struggle and to control the other 
groups that compose society. 
5
The many minority groups in the Middle East have caused many ethnic 
problems, despite the existence of the strong cultural and religious 
attribute of Islam (Harik, 1972).  Druze, who are one of the smallest 
minorities in the Middle East, similar to many minorities worldwide, have 
managed to survive and maintain their ethnic uniqueness, thanks to the 
physical geographical conditions that exist in their mountain settlements 
(Olmert, 1986) in Lebanon, Syria and Israel. 
Syria is a country whose population is varied and split, almost like that of 
Lebanon.  Certain minorities are concentrated in specific regions.  Syrian 
policy ignores problems stemming from the country's population 
composition, and aims to solve the problem by assimilating ethnic groups 
and minorities within the Sunni Muslim majority.  Hesitation regarding 
the creation of a pluralistic political system in Syria has greatly 
determined its grip on the Pan-Arab nationalistic theory in Syria, 
according to which Druze are Arabs.  Ethnic loyalty and definition are 
perceived as separatist, and therefore hostile towards the Arab national 
interest.  This approach has been unable to cancel out ethnic identification 
and its importance as a factor in relations between Druze and other ethnic 
groups (Rabinowitz, 1989). 
Throughout the generations, the Druze have been in a constant blood 
soaked battle with the Arab Sunni Moslems.  In the 18th century during 
Ottoman reign, as a result of this struggle, they retreated to the mountains 
that are named after them, the Druze Mountains.  When Syria was under 
the French Mandate rule in the 1920s, the Druze fought against being 
included as part of Arab Syria (Fisher, 1980). As a result of their struggle, 
an  agreement  was signed  between the  Druze  and the   French  in 1921, 
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according to which Druze Mountain was declared independent under the 
auspices of the French Mandate (Roi, 1957). 
Rejection of the "multi-character" principle of the state on the part of the 
Syrian government is expressed in its attitude towards the Druze 
minority, an attitude which led to the cancellation of the autonomous 
status that the Druze enjoyed.  This led to the rebellion of the Druze in 
1954, a rebellion that was cruelly repressed by the Syrian army (Ben 
Arie, 1978; Firro, 1988).  As a result, and despite their geographic 
concentration on Druze Mountain and their religious social uniqueness, 
the Druze process of assimilation in Syria was accelerated, expressed in 
their integration in the Syrian army and among the ranks of the Ba'ath 
ruling party in Syria (Olmert, 1986).  This has led to their loss of status, 
being now considered a small, inconsequential minority lacking any 
cultural, political or militant influence (Kliot, 1989). 
Lebanese ethnic structure is characterized by religious differences.  And 
despite the fact that everyone speaks a common language and shares a 
common culture, ethnic feelings differ and separate between them.  
Therefore, very few Lebanese citizens identify with their country and 
define themselves as Lebanese (Gordon, 1980).  The Lebanese political 
system was based on recognition of the importance of ethnic separatism, 
balance between ethnic groups, and the need to cope with this balance 
(Rabinowitz, 1989).  In Lebanon's National Convention of 1943, a 
formulation was made of the continued existence of Lebanon.  The Druze 
received their part as a six percent minority, and since then a tradition has 
been created whereby the Defense Minister of the Lebanese government 
is a member of the Druze sect  (Olmert, 1986). That  is to  say, the  Druze 
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 enjoy status that is disproportionate to their numbers, and have managed 
to maintain their rights, their strong status, and their political and cultural 
identity (Kliot, 1989). 
The current crisis in Lebanon that continues to eat away at the power of 
the central government, together with Israel's intervention in Lebanon in 
1982, and the armed struggle between the Druze and Lebanese Christian 
forces during the First Lebanon War and the Shuf War between the Druze 
and the Christians after the Israeli forces retreated, completed the tear 
between the Druze and the state, which led to  Druze autonomy in the 
Shuf Mountains (Firro, 1988) and continued emphasis placed on Druze 
uniqueness as a separate ethnic group.  However, for historical and 
political reasons, the Druze do not deny their Arab nationalism (Salah, 
1989). 
Israeli society is a pluralistic society composed of three main ethnic 
groups: Jews of Eastern European origin, Jews of Oriental origin, and 
Arabs.  Oriental Jews have been assimilated into Israeli Eastern European 
society (Halpern, 1980).  Nevertheless, there are conflicts between 
Oriental and European Jews, which are not institutionalized, and less 
severe than other conflicts, such as those between secular and religious 
Jews.  The third conflict within Israeli society, which is the most severe, 
is the national pluralism between Jews and Arabs, which is a deep 
cultural, religious, institutional, ideological, nationalistic,  status based 
and regional split (Smooha, 1976). 
Even in ancient times, the Israeli nation was forced to cope with problems 
of religious or nationalist minorities.  As a result of this reality, there are 
references in the  Mishna and Gemarrah to a number of  Jewish laws  that  
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are based on concern for normal relations with minorities and the creation 
of coexistence.  There has never been a Jewish religious trend to cause 
strife between non-Jewish minorities living in Israel .  In the State of 
Israel, the central Israeli  government  and the  dominant  Jewish majority  
takes on the pluralistic approach described in the models by Kliot (1989) 
and  Simpson & Yinger (1985).  This approach allows the existence of 
various cultures and minorities within the state, and supports their 
rights using legal and institutional methods, expressed in the 
existence of a unique system of relations between the Jewish majority 
and the other nationalistic and religious minorities, based on the 
principles of coexistence and mutual respect, outlined in the 
Declaration of Independence. 
2. The Status of the Druze Minority in the State of Israel 
The Arab minority in Israel is composed of three religious groups: 
Moslem, Christian and Druze.  The question of Druze belonging to the 
Arab minority is unclear, and there has been no historical research of the 
ethnic origins of the Druze to provide an unequivocal answer to this 
question.  A number of Western researchers have argued that the Druze 
are the descendents of ethnic groups that lived in the region and were 
eradicated over the course of history, or they have attributed the Druze to 
Persian, Turkish, Indian, Hittite or even European origin (Firro, 1988).  
Other Western researchers and Druze and Arab historians have argued 
that the Druze are Arabs originating from the Arabian peninsula (Talia, 
1973 Abu Izzeddin,1984).On the other hand, the Arab historian Hitti 
(1928) argues that the Druze are a mixture of Persian, Kurdish and Arabic 
races. 
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Throughout all historical eras, the Druze were only a majority in the 
Middle East in their own limited regions.  But in comparison to the entire 
administrative region or state - whether Syria, Lebanon or Israel, they 
have been a small minority, generally subordinate to Sunni Moslem rule, 
which did not recognize them as a separate sect (Salah, 1989).  The unity  
of the Druze in the Middle East stems from their need to maintain 
existence of their ethnic group, maintaining a unique religion, within the 
broader Moslem world, which considers them to be heretics.  Therefore 
the Druze have required a flexible and multi-faceted policy in order to 
maintain their existence.  The need to adjust to the powers that be in the 
region stems from the fact that they are a minority and their religion 
allows them to mask themselves and adjust in cases of persecution.  The 
Druze tend towards separatism.  Throughout their history they have 
maintained their religious independence. This separatism is based on their 
ethnic and religious uniqueness, but with all of the Druze separatist 
leanings, no desire has ever developed for full independence.  They do 
not rebel against foreign rule over them, on condition that the rule does 
not disrupt their traditional and religious lifestyle (Yanai, 1972).  
Although the entire Druze sect is considered to be one ethnic group, it is 
possible to consider them separately based on geographic areas - the 
Galilee and the Carmel.  The Druze of the Galilee live in small isolated 
villages, far from the city.  On the other hand, the Druze of the Carmel 
live near the city and their exposure to the Jewish community is greater. 
The Druze ethnic group in Israel is known to be unique as a minority 
group.  It is a sect that has maintained its religious, social, geographic and 
ethnic nature for more than 900 years.  Because  they are a  separate  sect,  
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they have been propelled into mountain regions where they set up their 
towns.  In this way they would be close to one another or at least able to 
maintain eye contact between their villages.  In Israel the Druze 
population numbers approximately 80,000 members (C.B.S., 1990), 
living in 22 towns spread throughout the north of Israel, and in two other 
areas of the  Middle East, Lebanon and the Druze Mountain of Syria.  
Eye contact between these villages is absolute and includes 18 towns in 
Israel spread through the Carmel, Lower Galilee, Upper Galilee, and 
Western Galilee.  Eight of these villages are solely Druze, while four 
contain Druze and Christians only, and five contain a mixed population of 
Druze, Christians and Moslems.  There are no villages which contain 
only Druze and Moslems.  22% of the population live in the Carmel, 60% 
live in the Galilee, and  the 18% remaining live in four villages on the 
Golan Heights, a separate group from the rest of the State of Israel.  They 
are different in nature, geographic position and their relationship with the 
Israeli government and population (Sofer, 1992). 
From the standpoint of their aims, the Druze of Israel are similar to 
pluralistic minorities described in Barron's model (1967).  They would 
like to maintain their religious and cultural uniqueness and demand 
tolerance of the dominant group.  This assumption is based on the fact 
that throughout all historical eras, the Druze have aimed for separate and 
institutionalized status.  During the Ottoman period and during the British 
Mandate the Druze did not manage to achieve a status equal to that which 
the Moslems, Christians and Jews attained, a status of a community with 
religious definition, legislative institutions and family law courts.  They 
were    considered   to   be     Moslems   (Shammash, 1970) .  The   Israeli 
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 government responded to their request in 1950 when it appointed a 
minister of the religious council (spiritual leader), and in 1957, the 
government first recognized the Druze of Israel as an independent sect.  
Later, in 1962, the government passed the Law of Druze Courts (Falah, 
1974).  It has been said that the Druze adopt loyalty to the country for 
which they fight, giving their loyalty without hesitation to the homeland 
in which they live.  But in Israel this is both a national feeling and a 
feeling of fate, as they do not feel that they live as a minority. 
The question of Druze national attribution to Israel is problematic.  In 
Syria and Lebanon, the Druze are totaled with the Arab nation.  However 
the Druze in Israel, for historical and geographical reasons, allow 
themselves to operate based on their own interests and to show a position 
which is not sympathetic towards or serving the National Arab Movement 
(Salah, 1989).  The establishment and Israeli researchers consider the 
Druze of Israel as a unique and separate category from the Jewish sector 
and the Arab sector.  The existence of this category is explained based on 
culture, history, ethnic group, and explained generally as a product of the 
long tradition of separatism and solidarity of the Druze (Oppenheimer, 
1985).  Israeli policy has emphasized the traditional particularism of the 
Druze and reinforced their identity, separating it from Arab and Islam 
identity (Firro, 1988).  Within the framework of this policy for 
highlighting Druze uniqueness, in 1976 it was decided that Druze 
Heritage would be studied in Druze schools in order to highlight the 
unique values of Druze cultural tradition and cultivation of Druze-Israeli 
awareness, the uniqueness of Druze tradition, and in order to educate 
Druze who are proud of their heritage, loyal to their tradition and religion 
and the values of their culture, and loyal to the State of Israel. 
12
Formal recognition of the Druze sect in Israel has paved the way for 
Druze political separation from the rest of the Arab minority on a 
nationalistic basis.  When registering residents of Israel and classification 
of the population, there are two categories: Religion and Nationality.  
Druze religion has been added to the list that exists which in the past 
included Jews, Moslems and Christians.  If the Druze are considered to be 
a religions sect, and from a nationalistic standpoint they are not Jews, 
they may only be attributed to the Arab national group, and this was how 
they had been registered until the early 1960s. At this time a change 
occurred: the similarity of the Druze to the Jewish model in which 
religion and nationality were connected, served as an example to create a 
new "nation", and as of 1962, the name "Druze" replaced "Arab" as their 
nationality  on Druze birth certificates and identification cards.  Since 
then the Druze of Israel are officially not Arabs.  The most outstanding 
symbol of the separation of the Druze from the rest of the Arab minority 
is their obligatory service in the IDF (Oppenheimer, 1985). 
The role of the Druze in the Israeli army has always been ideologically 
important within Israeli political culture.  According to Frisch (1993) the 
role of the Druze population in the Israeli army and security forces is 
unusual in modern times.  Not only are the Druze considered to be a 
minority population within the Israeli defense forces, but they are also a 
military minority who specializes in handling the problematic Palestinian 
minority. 
Olivia (1972) who related to the question of the Druze national 
belonging, argued that there are three central trends within the Druze sect 
in Israel:  some argue  that  they  do not  see the  Druze as Arabs,  because   
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from  their free will they are interested in identifying with the state of 
Israel and creating a covenant with the state.  This sector is interested in 
creating uniqueness in both Druze and Israeli awareness. The next group 
considers the Druze to be Arabs but does not attribute this fact with any 
significance requiring them to behave in a specific way.  What is much 
more significant is the fact that they are Israeli Druze.  This group also 
strongly speaks about Druze Israeli awareness and the desire for 
involvement in living along with the state and its citizens, of course 
without losing its Druze uniqueness.  They also see their recruitment to 
the IDF very positively and their desire is to achieve rights and 
obligations equal to all the Jewish Israeli citizens.  The third group is the 
one that considers themselves Arabs, identifying totally with the Arab 
nationality.  Those with this outlook consider their service in the IDF as a 
clear contradiction to their nationalistic Arab identity. 
For more than twenty years, the Israeli establishment considered the 
Druze to be like all other minorities and handling of their problems was 
through the "Arab departments" not differentiating between Druze, 
Moslems and Christians.  According to Frisch (1993) the strongest 
official Israeli voice calling for integration of the Druze was heard in 
1967 when the Prime Minister Levy Eshkol was impressed by Druze 
performance in the Six Day War, separating between the Druze and the 
rest of the Arab population, allowing the Druze to turn directly to various 
Government offices and considering them equally to the Jewish citizens 
of Israel.  This was done despite the fact that Druze youths served three 
years in the army and many continued after their service to serve in the 
security forces, mainly giving their lives for the security of Israel.  Druze 
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 youths found out during their military service and after their liberation 
from the security forces, that they had more in common with their Israeli 
friends in arms than with their Arab neighbors.  But on the other hand, 
they were not equal to them in the eyes of the establishment .  The 
Druse's recruitment to the IDF and their integration in the Israeli security 
system led to an economic revolution in Druze villages (Sofer, 1992), 
because in the past, the economy of Druze villages was not much 
different than other minority villages in Israel.  Economy was based on 
traditional agriculture, orchards and even fewer crops than the Moslems 
on the plains.  A small number of individuals supported themselves 
through services within the village, and an even smaller number provided 
services outside of the villages.  Some provided transportation services, 
as the Druze villages are far from major cities.  Hassan (1998) found that 
more than 555 of those employed among the Druze began to work in the 
various security forces: the IDF, Border Police, police, prison services 
and the Military Industry.  As early as the end of the 1960s, Druze youths 
began to demand that handling of their issues be removed from the Arab 
departments and they found support for this among the Jews.  In the 
middle of the 1970s, the government responded to their demands and 
appointed the Ben Dor Committee in 1974.  In 1975, the Schechterman 
Committee examined the issue and recommended removing the Druze 
from the Arab offices of the government, and transferring their treatment 
to the General Managers' committee, composed of the General Managers 
of the Government Offices and of Druze Consultants (Salah, 1989).  
Later, in April 1987, the government decided to provide Druze with equal 
rights to Jews, but this decision was never actually applied, and the Druze   
have not been properly handled  receiving  full rights  like Jewish  youths,  
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despite military services. This has led to frustration and uprising among 
youngsters in the sect.  Recently the feelings of neglect and frustration 
have led to uprisings and strong claims have been heard against 
government policy, such as:  "Loyalty but no nurturing", "we are equal to 
Jews only in obligations",  "we want to be blue and white", etc. 
In summary, the Druze of Israel are a national minority and consider 
themselves to be an integral part of the State of Israel.  They are in 
the process of being integrated in the Israeli state and society 
(Stendel, 1973).  On the other hand, the Druze of Syria and Lebanon 
consider themselves an integral part of the Arab world (Olivia, 1972). 
This integration has led to changes and modernization in Druze 
villages and allows them to place pressure on the Israeli 
establishment for receipt of benefits in the field of education and 
development (Mayer, 1976).  It should be noted that integration is 
still only partial, and the Jews along with the Druze doubt actual 
realization of full integration in the future (Friendly, 1981).  Druze 
youth considers their recruitment into the IDF as part of  their civic 
obligation towards the state and expect equal rights from the state to 
those of the Jewish population serving in the army, expressed in 
equality and equal opportunities in democratic political life and good 
citizenship.
3. Druze Values 
In recent years, Druze society has been in a process of transition to more 
modernization and openness towards the western world.   Despite the fact 
that  this is occurring in other Oriental cultures, this socialization  process  
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is entirely directed based on the Druze religious philosophy.  This 
philosophy emphasizes the individual's unlimited identification with the 
omnipotence of God, and directs the individual to accept the basic values 
of his culture, maintaining them and identifying with his family and the 
Druze community.  The basic values of Druze culture stem from its 
religion and focus on three principles: 
The first principle is the principle of "Tikiya" or "hiding".  This principle 
stems from Druze history from the era of "El Mahana" (the Test) from 
1018-1024.  During this time the Druze were persecuted in Egypt and 
Syria and were forced to renounce their Druze religion.  The principle of 
hiding allows those who uphold it to pretend they belong to the ruling 
religion, but to secretly maintain the principles of their religion (Abu 
Shikra, 1984; Abu-Izzeddin, 1984).  The principle of hiding became 
ingrained in the Druze culture in many ways, even after the Druze were 
not persecuted anymore.  Therefore in the political-social sphere, this 
principle is expressed in the fact that the Druze adjust to and are loyal to 
the country in which they live. 
The second principle is the principle of "Hafed El Ahoan" (assisting 
brothers).  Druze religion attributes ultimate importance to helping one's 
Druze brothers.  This principle reinforces internal loyalty, which cancels 
out individual importance in face of the entire group.  Therefore the 
individual must suit himself to his environment. 
The third principle is the principle of "Alrada Ve'Atislam" (acceptance).  
This principle means accepting the will of God and His decrees.  If the 
Druze individual feels that he is in distress, according to his religion he 
must only  trust in the  force of God to  change the situation for the better.  
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 He must pray and accept the decree (Elkesma) out of belief in the fact 
that fate could be either a punishment or a test.  Furthermore, Druze 
believe in "Tekmatz" (reincarnation), according to which the soul moves 
from body to body and does not die. 
These principles, according to which Druze youths are educated, direct 
the Druze towards a process of acceptance and adjustment.  Therefore, 
they do not try to change their environment but rather themselves, and to 
accept what occurs around them as the will of God, which must not be 
opposed. 
Based on these religious beliefs taught in the Druze Heritage 
curriculum, Druze adolescents tend to maintain belief in fate and 
reincarnation as values which affect their future behavior, 
particularly when they volunteer and risk their lives, as will be 
examined in the research.  Druze beliefs have an impact over 
volunteering and serving in the army. 
4. Identity 
According to the philosophical theories of Descartes and Kant (Fox, 
1993), the concept of identity is defined in terms of unity.  Taylor's 
(1991) and Alexander's (2001) community approach define the concept of 
identity as "Who are we? And where do we come from?  Where are we 
going?".   Other theorists, such as Heiddeger (Fox, 1993) define identity 
in terms of essence.  Further theories have defined identity as a product 
which is designed by political mechanisms historically built into structure 
and organized from a social standpoint (McLaren, 1997; Gur-Ze'ev, 
1997). 
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Psychological theories understand the concept of identity as an internal 
structure developing and becoming consolidated within the individual 
like other psychological structures such as emotions, cognition etc. 
(Erikson, 1968; ; Zuriel, 1990).  Sociological anthropological theories 
attribute identity to being a direct result of the socialization process 
within the community (Roseman  et al., 1990; Fisherman, 1992; Ben 
Shalom and Hornchik, 2000; Holland, 1998). 
A survey of psychological and sociological theories will assist in 
surveying the problem of identity in the State of Israel, where concern for 
identity is great.  The modern democratic world of the State of Israel 
developed dialogue regarding the issue of identity among various groups, 
such as the Arab group, and recently the Druze group.  The State of Israel 
is considered to be a multi-cultural state, containing various groups and 
communities committed to the democratic regime, in which it is 
impossible to apply the principle of a majority forcing itself on the other 
groups within the state, based on political elements serving the benefit of 
the majority (Gur-Ze'ev, 1997).  From the viewpoint of liberal theories, 
the concept "democracy" should reflect that a state maintains good, fair 
and just relations towards all groups existing within it (Taylor, 1989; 
Alexander, 2001).  In Israel this attribute is in doubt and requires a new 
look based on the theoretical aspects mentioned above. 
The Concept of Identity Based on Philosophical Theories
Descartes and Kant (Fox, 1993) define the concept of identity in terms of 
unity.  Descartes perceived identity in terms of an important entity versus 
a   spreading  entity,  while   Kant   perceived   identity   in  terms  of   the  
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transcendental self and the experimental self.  At the same time, 
Heiddeger, an existential philosopher, perceived  the concept of identity 
in qualitative  terms  (Fox, 1993), i.e., not its unity  but  rather  the 
essence of the human individual is what is important.  Golomb (2000) 
argues that identity generally contains consensual components which 
apply to sects, publics, societies, and nations and also exist within 
cultures and languages, and are identifiable.  On the other hand, 
authenticity is much more hazy, because it involves the connection of the 
individual with himself, his ego, and is much more easily definable.  This 
is the way I identify myself and create myself.  An authentic individual 
creates and molds his life and personality through what he creates. 
The community perception (Taylor, 1989, 1991) criticizes liberal 
philosophy.  This criticism brings us back to Hegel's critique of Kant.  
Hegel argues that it is impossible to maintain a society based on freedom 
as Kant perceives it, based on the "self" - the individual, which is 
detached from the community, society, language and history.  According 
to Walzer (1984) the "self" is too small to set up the citizen within 
democratic society which must make complex decisions based on certain 
morals.  Therefore instead of declaring the end of the modern era as done 
by various post-modernists, and offering radical solutions like the neo-
Marxists, the community perception offers an essential correction to 
radical society by perceiving the individual as a product designed within 
the community and through the moral dialogue that the individual 
develops with the community, based on education towards insight, the 
ability to err, and freedom of will.   
On the other hand, the critical theory, which is pessimistic and innovative 
(McLaren, 1997: Gur-Ze'ev, 1997), stems from radical Marxist tradition 
as presented  by Marx, and  existentialism as  presented  by  Heiddeger.  
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This pedagogy comes out against political, economic and status based 
repression and calls for  identification of power  mechanisms  that operate  
behind actions, and understanding the ways that human identity is 
designed within the public space. 
The present dissertation will depend upon these two philosophical 
theories, the critical and the innovative, which will assist in 
understanding the manner in which Druze identity is formed and 
how the group supercedes the individual.  Community is made 
possible through a new way of thought regarding construction of 
Druze identity in terms of freedom of will, insight and the ability to 
err. 
Taylor (1991), a primary supporter of community theory, argues that the 
concept of authenticity belongs to modern culture.  The idea of 
authenticity is the idea of freedom, including design of one's personal life, 
which opposes conformist external formats.  According to Taylor, 
defining the self means finding the self according to my ability to debate 
important truths, or through my resurrection of my forefathers' traditions.  
He calls for the dissolution of Kant's isolating self (Fox, 1993), and brings 
the self into society, demanding that it be recognized.  Our identity is 
designed through dialogue with others, and it does not matter if we agree 
with them or not.  Furthermore, Taylor (1989) argues that our identity is 
defined by commitments and identification, which construct the platform 
on which we are able to determine what is good or valuable, what should 
be done, and to what we oppose.  He argues that we are entities that are 
created in a space full of questions, and we search for an orientation 
towards good.  This can only exist and be emphasized as a social-cultural 
language. 
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Therefore, Taylor (1989) feels that the preferred definition of an 
individual's  identity is that  which includes not only the individual's 
moral attitudes and spiritual issues, but is also connected to some social 
definition.  The Druze sect can be seen as a sect that is searching for a 
way to maintain its unique identity as a minority in a country that aims 
for modern status in political and economic terms, on one hand, but as a 
nation which may have left these modern perceptions for similar attitudes 
in post-modern philosophy. 
Personal Psychological Identity
Psychological approaches generally understand the concept of identity as 
an internal structure that develops, is consolidated and expressed within 
the individual, without any emphasis on the issue of the dialectics taking 
place between the individual and society, similar to other psychological 
structures, such as cognition, emotions, etc. 
The concept of personal identity was coined as a basic concept within the 
psychology of adolescence by Erikson (1968).  But this concept was 
perceived in terms of the individual's dialectics with society and not only 
in terms of internal structures developing within the individual, providing 
meaning to one's life.  Erikson perceives the concept of personal identity 
as a concept developed throughout the individual's life at all stages of life.  
However, during adolescence its formation is the main developmental 
task.  Breakwell (1986), Roseman and Frankel (1990) and Gortevant 
(1992) consider mutual relations between identity stemming from social 
factors external to the individual, when looking at the identity stemming 
from unique factors within the individual as those that finally design the 
overall self identity. 
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Group Identity in Sociology and Anthropology
Rachman (1975) considers the term "self identity" a central concept that 
aids adolescents, and emphasizes that the process of consolidating the 
identity cannot be an internal process that begins and ends within the 
individual himself, but rather, must spread out into the social and public 
planes.  According to Reicher (1982), the individual within the group 
exchanges his individual identity for the group identity.  Group identity 
within the mass is created by the actions of the group. The individual 
draws conclusions regarding group identity through the actions of its 
members.  Ben Ami (1990) sees the family as a group and a response to 
the success in the individual process within the adolescent.  Fishman 
(1997) argues that the process of searching for an identity generally 
occurs within the peer group.  The "group of friends" becomes the 
adolescent's main object of attribution and replaces the parents.  Fear of 
losing or blurring of self identity leads to certain phenomena, such as 
adhering to the group, lack of tolerance and cruelty, and distancing people 
who are different, all as a necessary form of defense against the feeling of 
blurred identity. 
In their research on Jewish adolescents in Canada, Markstrom, Berman & 
Brusch (1998) discerned a concept called "ethnic identity".  Chanel 
(1994) defined ethnic identity as the manner in which the individual 
understands himself in relation to others who have a shared racial, 
religious or national origin.  This feeling of shared origin helps in 
creating an atmosphere of solidarity and connection to the ethnic group of 
attribution.  The ethnic  
identity of the individual can be only one of a number of identities within 
one's   system, some of which  are  more  essential  than others, and  some  
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of which become more central only because of special circumstances 
(Levin, 1951). 
Social relations between ethnic groups may be characterized according to 
three dimensions: Separation-integration; majority control-equality; and 
struggle-cooperation.  These dimensions may represent possible models 
of ethno-social relations in pluralistic societies (Kipnis, 1988; Smooha, 
1984).  Ben Shalom and Hornchik (1999) argue that in the literature there 
are a number of concepts that relate to the connection between the 
individual and his cultural group.  They may be listed as: national 
identity, cultural identity, and basic group identity.  Differentiating 
between the concepts is not always clear or consensual (Hutnik, 1991).  
One of the difficulties in identifying cultural identity through one concept 
(Liebkind, 1992) in a general manner is that cultural identity is a 
conglomerate of cognitive, emotional and behavioral aspects expressing 
the nature of the connection between the individual and his ethnic, 
national or cultural group (Hutnik, 1991).  Group identity of minority 
groups, including immigrant groups, is often discussed in the literature as 
the source of various difficulties on a psychological level (Ben Shalom & 
Hornchik, 1999).  For example: low self esteem based on discrimination 
or prejudice (Tajfel, 1978); feelings of isolation and marginality 
(Blackwell & Hart, 1982); or a sense of confused identity (Erikson, 
1968). 
Religious Identity
The study of religious identity has expanded recently as a result of the 
impact of modernization over religious individuals.  Amir (1992, in 
Shlomo   and   Bar-Lev,   2001)  defines   the  religious   identity   of   the  
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adolescent as a system of attitudes and positions that the adolescent holds 
regarding himself as a religious youth.  Mol (1978) explains that religion 
develops religious identity and this contributes to group consolidation.  
The uniqueness of each religious group (ceremonies, beliefs and 
emotional involvement) creates a group identity that continues to be 
constructed through it.  Religious truths later become a personal part of 
the individual in the group and a component of his religious identity.  
According to Rosen (2005), religion provides meaning to what we are, 
and is included in various circles and components of human identity (Beit 
Hallahmi (1989) argues that it is necessary to differentiate between 
religious identity, which is a "social label" and "religious belief", as a 
central component in perceiving identity.  Relating to religions identity as 
a social label such as nationality, gender or socioeconomic status, is 
supported by the argument that most people in the world are born into 
this group, and this is an attributive and not achievable identity.  The 
individual grows up in a family and a community having a certain 
religious attribution.  On the other hand, there is a religions identity 
stemming from the individual's identification with a personal set of 
values. 
Bar-Lev & Laslow (1993) present a number of central typologies for 
personal identity and religious identity.  One of these typologies, 
conducted by Glock & Stark (1965) and Bar-Lev and Laslow (1993) 
characterizes five aspects of religiosity: 1) the belief-ideology aspect;  
2) the behavioral-ritualistic aspect; 3) the emotional-experiential aspect; 
4) the religious knowledge aspect; 5) the result aspect. 
Biahihejad, Hode & White (1986) indicated that there is no connection 
between  religious  commitment  and  self  identity .  On  the  other  hand,  
25
Fulten (1997) found a positive correlation between identity status and 
religious orientation among Christian students. 
Kind, Elder & Whitbech (1997) examined religious activity and self 
identity among rural youth and found a significant correlation between 
youth growing up in rural areas and the development of strong ties with 
religious institutions.  It is also worthwhile to note the study by Tlicki 
(1997) which examined and found clear changes in self identity, but less 
in religious identity in Jewish youths of Polish origins who immigrated to 
Sweden.  Pedersen (1997) found religious preferences of respondents to 
be in keeping with the centrality of aspects of self identity.  Shafat (1995) 
feels that immigrant youths with a consolidated self identity know what 
to choose, whereas youths with confused identities do not know what to 
choose and their religious identity is less consolidated. 
Multiple Identities
The literature discusses the correlation between maintaining a number of 
cultural identities and between quality of life.  Understanding the state of 
the individual coping with multiple cultural identities can lead to two 
contradictory predictions (Ben Shalom & Hornchik, 1999):  On one hand, 
it may be hypothesized that maintaining one identity at the expense of 
other identities prevents conflicts and therefore contributes to the personal 
welfare of the individual.  On the other hand, maintaining a number of 
group identities that the individual considers to be positive, can be a 
source for social, cultural and material resources.  In daily life the 
individual can choose the identity that suits the context in which he is 
operating, recruiting relevant  social  support  in a  manner  that assists his  
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emotional adjustment . Research findings of Ben Shalom & Hornchik 
(1999, 2000) show that there is a positive correlation between each 
cultural identity and adjustment.  Furthermore, it was found that the more 
positive identities respondents had, the higher their level of adjustment, 
both on a psychological level and regarding quality of life in the 
dormitory.  Thoits (1983) also argued that multiple identities were 
beneficial for the individual.  She found a positive correlation between 
the number of identities that an individual has and between quality of life.  
According to Thoits, although multiple identities could cause conflicts 
between roles, it may lower feelings of isolation and provide more 
meaning to life.  The research findings of Ben Shalom & Hornchik (1999, 
2000), are in keeping with studies in the literature that show that a 
consolidated cultural identity is important in aiding adjustment among 
minorities (Phinney, 1995). Gorney (2000) differentiates between two 
types of identity, individual identity and collective identity.  Individual 
identity is formed through the individual's limited circles - family and the 
society in which he is raised.  The individual's identity can change over 
the years through a transition from one culture to another.  Collective 
identity varies based on historical processes, sometimes sharply and very 
significantly.   
I now turn to Israeli reality and problems of identity within Israeli society 
and the social context in which Druze identity is designed. 
The Problem of Identity in the State of Israel
Israel is presently perceived as a state with a western character, but at the 
same time containing traditional societies whose lifestyle is in 
contradiction to  the  western  world, such  as  the  Druze.  Therefore   the 
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following questions can be asked: What is Druze identity and what does it 
signify?  How is it consolidated under the current circumstances in the 
state of Israel, characterized by a democratic and multi-cultural regime, 
coping with the impact of the western world and post-modernist 
dialogue?  At the same time the state has not managed to liberate itself 
from its Jewish character which places it at odds with other cultural 
groups within the state which do not belong to this religions group, 
including the Druze, who are perceived not to be in a conflict with the 
Jews.  This multi-cultural reality can be discerned  through the great 
degree of tension between Jews who struggle to maintain a uniform 
cultural nature within the state and between Arab groups who demand 
recognition of an Arab state alongside the ruling Israeli state. 
In this context of the politics of identities, I will first discuss the study of 
identity among the Arab population, to which the Druse sect belongs 
from a linguistic and social standpoint.  In Israeli reality, the Arab 
population is in strong conflict with the Jewish cultural group because it 
demands recognition of an independent Arab state alongside Israel.  The 
Arab group is currently threatening the Israeli political order and 
undermining its security in various ways simultaneously.  This group, 
particularly the Moslem group, is in a constant state of conflict with the 
Druze group, as seen throughout historical eras.  The Moslems' treatment 
of the Druze in Jordan and Syria is clear, where tolerance has not 
developed towards the Druze as a religious group, deviating from Islam.  
This tension is even stronger in light of the good relations existing 
between the Jews and the Druze of Israel, and the fact that the Druze 
serve in the security forces. 
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The Study of Identity Among the Arab Population
Most researchers who addressed to the issue of the identity of the Arab 
population of Israel agree on two central components of the issue (Alhaj, 
1997):  The civilian component stemming from the actual status of Arabs 
as citizens of the state; and the nationalistic component which is a direct 
result of the national attribution of Arabs in Israel and the Arab world to 
the Palestinian world.  He feels that since the inception of the State, 
formation of the identities of Arabs in Israel and their attitude towards the 
state and the Jewish population have been influenced, by four central 
circles: 
a. The local circle, touching on the internal structure of the Arab 
population and changes that occurred over time in the system of values 
and patterns of life. 
b. The national circle, touching on the status of Arabs in the state and 
formal policy taken towards the Arabs, in addition to the informal and 
formal relations with the Jewish majority. (the Arab minority is a non-
assimilationist minority, different from the majority regarding 
nationalism and national identity, ethnic origins, religion, and social 
demographic attributes).  The common perception is that the State of 
Israel was established by the Jews for the Jews.  The Jewish nature of the 
state is obvious in its symbols, flag, anthem and holidays (Smooha, 1989) 
and anchored in a number of laws that have entrenched this nature, such 
as: the Law of Return, the Law of Citizenship, the Law of Israeli Lands 
(Van Lear and the Ministry of Education, 1984).  Realization of these 
laws is in conflict with the democratic nature of the State of Israel, as they 
determine different measures for Jews and Arabs (Alhaj, 1997). 
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c. The regional circle, touching on the special cultural and national 
connection of Arabs in Israel with the Arab world in general, particularly 
with the Palestinian world. 
d. The religious circle, touching on ethnic identity among Moslem, 
Christians and Druze.  The Arab population of Israel is heterogeneous, of 
which 75% are Moslem, 15% are Christian and 10% are Druze (Israel 
Statistical Annual, 1991). 
Over time, Arabs in Israel developed a special "Palestinian Israeli" 
identity which includes two central components simultaneously:  The 
Israeli citizen component, and the Palestinian nationalist component.  
Balancing between these two components is complex and difficult, and 
perhaps even impossible under existing conditions.  Arabs of Israel are 
forced to cope with a state of continual conflict between their state and 
between their nation within Israeli political culture, a direct result of the 
definition of the Israeli state as a Jewish state and not a state for all of its 
citizens (Alhaj, 1997). 
The implications of the political process that began in 1993 regarding 
Arabs in Israel are complex and varied.  On one hand, the Israeli 
Palestinian dialogue, recognition of the PLO and the creation of the PA 
have led to a small degree of legitimization of the Palestinian component 
among a large part of the Israeli population.  As a result, the contrast 
between the nationalistic and civilian components in Israeli Arab identity 
has dulled.  The political process and the start of resolving the national 
question have also led to positioning the civilian issue and the struggle 
over the nature of the State of Israel at the head of Israeli Arab priorities.  
Chanel (1994) differentiates simultaneously between three basic identities 
that may be relevant to the real life of Israeli Arabs: 
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Defining themselves as Israeli Arabs and therefore emphasizing their 
belonging to Israel; perceiving themselves as identifying with the PLO 
and therefore emphasizing their belonging to the Palestinian nationality; 
perceiving themselves Israeli and Palestinians,  a middle of the road 
position.  Hertz Lazerovitz (1982) found that the group of Arab youth that 
defines itself as "Israeli Arab" is characterized by a strong family sub-
identity, a strong religious sub-identity, and positive attitudes towards 
school.  The group that defines itself as "Palestinian Arab", is 
characterized by strong sub identities in the following: family, and 
citizenship (emphasis on the connection to the land of Israel and not the 
Arab nation). 
The complex nature of consolidating identity among the Arabs in 
Israel is similar in part to the complexity of consolidating the identity 
of the Druze ethnic group.  In order to understand this complexity, it 
is necessary to first survey the historical background of the Druse 
sect throughout the world in general, and specifically within the State 
of Israel.
The Study of Identity among the Druse Ethnic Group
The Druze in History:  Approximately one thousand years have passed 
since the Druze appeared in history as carriers of a new religion and 
philosophy.  In the past, they had lived for a long time under the auspices 
of the Islamic nation, and only in the 11th century (the time of Kalifa 
Fatmeh "Alhakam Bamer Allah") they declared themselves as an 
independent monotheistic sect, separate from Islam (Salah,1989).  During 
this  period, at least according to Druze memory, the  members of the sect  
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were forced to sacrifice much blood and be extremely brave, insightful 
and wily to maintain their physical existence and their unique identity 
(Falah, 2000).  However, if the Druze to not maintain national uniqueness 
in the accepted meaning of the word, how has this sect managed to 
maintain its uniqueness and existence through all of the wars and the 
persecution that they went through over the thousand years of their 
existence?  Some of the factors that are highly important to the continued 
existence of the Druze are as follows (Falah, 2000): 
a. The religious factor: Thanks to the Druze religion and its power, 
members of the sect have maintained their way of life throughout the 
years, although only a small number of the sect, called the "Okal" know 
all the secrets of the religion.  Religion was also a helpful source for 
creating important frameworks to highlight the uniqueness of the religion 
and to feed its ability to survive, particularly Druze religious law: laws of 
marriage and divorce, inheritance, bequeathing, etc. 
b. The nature of the social regime of most Druze communities in the 
Middle East is patriarchal, based on a strong family and extended family 
led by the father of the family and the Sheikh of the extended family.  
This format is in strong contrast with the growing feministic outlook 
which has been recently expanding, even among traditional societies, 
under the influence of modern developments. 
c. The long Druze history of persecution created a deep degree of 
solidarity within the sect.  "Hafad El Alhoan" meaning protecting the 
believing brother, provides religious validation for Druze solidarity.  This 
collective mutuality is reinforced by the important principle that prohibits 
marrying  anyone outside  of  the sect. The  practical  significance  of  this 
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 principle is that the Druze are one large family with stronger and stronger 
blood ties as the years go by, because if you were not born Druze you 
cannot join the religion.  This brotherhood achieves a level of eternal 
spiritual significance through the belief in reincarnation - this principle 
protects the Druze against assimilation, similar to what happened to the 
Jews in the Diaspora. 
d. The system of social values drawing from the religion.  This system 
has undoubtedly contributed to Druze uniqueness:  Modesty, telling the 
truth, bravery, hosting guests, a strong connection to the land (which is 
one of the most important three basic principles of Druze society: 
religion, land and respecting women), and agricultural work.  This system 
of relations within Druze society also includes external appearance, 
particularly among the Druze religious leaders and Druze women. 
e. The literary sphere: Despite the importance of Arab literature in the 
lives of the Druze sect, during the history of the sect, stories of Druze 
historical characters were created alongside stories of the exemplary way 
of life of the religious leaders.  The stories and acts of the heroes of these 
stories are raised at various opportunities, and complete the unique way 
of life of the sect, providing them with unique symbols for their 
traditions, and connecting them to their Druze heritage. 
At the end of the 20th century, as a result of the rise of modern 
nationalism, some of these unique factors mentioned above have become 
weaker, and a situation has been created that creates a risk to the 
continued existence of the sect.  Modernization processes through which 
secular education has expanded and media opportunities have developed, 
have  led  to  an  undermining   of  the   patriarchal  regime  and  religious  
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authority. Daily contact between members of the Druze sect and members  
of other ethnic groups - at work, in the military, within society and in 
other areas - have led the Druze on one hand to become closer to other 
groups, and on the other hand to look deeply into themselves to clarify 
the question of what actually sets them apart from their non-Druze 
counterparts. 
The question of the identity and essence of the Druze exists, of course, in 
all three geographic concentrations of Druze communities within the 
Middle East (Falah, 2000).  According to Falah, the question of identity 
arises in Israel based on the modern democratic nature of the country, 
which allows self expression and the ability of the Druze sect to demand 
equal rights and opportunities to those of the dominant Jewish group.  
Furthermore, it is a result of the small number of Druze and the affect of 
numbers on the ability to make decisions and determine policy, and also 
as a result of the longstanding tension between the Druze and the Moslem 
Arab group which did not develop tolerance towards the Druze when they 
deviated from Islam after once being considered a stream of Islam. 
The problem of Druze identity among the Druze of Israel arose in the 
early 1950s, and over time has become worse, until becoming one of the 
issues that most ignites all parts of the sect.  Recently, voices have been 
heard demanding taking vital steps to reinforce Druze uniqueness.  In 
addition to the fear of assimilation within Israeli society and Arab culture, 
these voices also express a desire for unique ethnic expression which was 
not allowed to them during the Turkish and British rule of Israel.  These 
people feel that there has been improvement in Druze status in Israel 
thanks to good  relations with the Jews and their contribution to the State.   
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They have also found a sympathetic ear among the Jewish public, who 
understands the Druze as they fight against assimilation and its dangers 
(Falah, 2000). 
In order to emphasize the uniqueness of the Druze, the government has 
established two committees: a public and a parliamentary committee, to 
study the reasons for Druze protest and bitterness, in order to improve 
relations between the Druze and the State of Israel.  These two 
committees paid great attention to the question of education in the Druze 
sector.  Furthermore, the Ben Dor committee saw that there was an urgent 
need to reinforce Druze awareness through processing a special 
curriculum for Druze schools.  The members of the committee expressed 
their concern that Druze children do not recognize the history of their 
sect, religion and traditions.  The committee expressed its belief that 
application of curricula in these  areas would help ameliorate the feelings 
of frustration stemming from identity problems.  The Schechterman 
committee also indicated that it was fatefully important to determine an 
independent Druze curriculum in order to allow continued existence of 
the sect (Falah, 2000). 
Based on the literature review to this point addressing the development of 
identity through philosophical, psychological and sociological theories, 
and based on Israeli reality, identity perceives the individual as a social 
dialectic and not as a liberal individual.  This outlook emphasizes that 
through the dialogue that the individual maintains with society in which 
he lives, its values, beliefs, norms and cultural codes, he will form his 
own identity. 
The research population chosen in the present dissertation is based on 
adolescents  belonging  to the  Druze  culture.  These  youths  are students 
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Learning in two high schools in Israel.  The students develop dialectics 
with their culture in addition to that which takes place within their social 
lives, within the framework of their formal studies in Heritage lessons.  
Therefore, the present dissertation will examine the essence of this 
dialectic and how it is expressed in formation of the identities of Druze 
adolescents. 
The Components of Druze Identity in the Curriculum
The participants in the present research are Druze adolescents studying in 
two Israeli high schools.  These adolescents spend much time within the 
educational context of their school.  Within this educational context there 
are seemingly attributes of the Druze community and social norms unique 
to the Druze sect, both overt and covert.  The interaction which occurs 
between the adolescent and the educational school context in which the 
child participates every day, leaves its mark, in my opinion, over the 
formation of his personality and identity.  Furthermore, the adolescent in 
the school context learns the subject of Heritage, a compulsory subject, in 
order to achieve a matriculation certificate. 
The aims of the Druze Heritage curriculum indicate that heritage lessons 
play a central role in forming identity and teaching Druze culture.  The 
cognitive and emotional aims of the Heritage curriculum, according to the 
Ministry of Education and Culture (2003) are: To familiarize the student 
with the heritage of the sect and what is typical of it, to know its values, 
to become familiar with important figures which played a role in the 
history of the sect.  To learn about the good relationship between Druze 
and others, to  know  about  the connection  between  Druze  heritage  and   
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Other religions and philosophies, old and new.  To become familiar with 
the current reality of the Druze, to be familiar with innovations 
transpiring in Druze heritage, and new interpretations.  To internalize the 
principles of religion based on belief in one God, speaking the truth, 
looking out for brothers, the eternal soul, day of judgment, reward and 
sanctions, justice and choice, accepting fate, commitment towards what is 
permissible and prohibited.  The student should be proud of his heritage, 
following the paths of good figures, feeling a common fate with members 
of the sect, identification and solidarity among people.  He should respect 
other religions, and increase his understanding and support of coexistence 
with others (Ministry of Education and Culture, 2003). 
5. Democratic Values 
Rotenstreich considers values to be principles of action, a sort of mini-
content that lead us to prefer one action over a different course of action.  
Values are mini-content for which one action that we desire, is more 
desirable, i.e., it should exist.  Peters (1983) notes that the existence of 
education should be considered only if it is something that is of value 
when achieved.  Education cannot exist without education towards values 
(Kleinberger, 1976; Oko, 1974).  A value is never a means but rather an 
end in and of itself. 
"These are systems of rules and customs that are accepted in a given 
society for assessing the acts or nature of its members (Kleinberger, 
1980).  Adar (1976) argues that it is necessary to differentiate between an 
attitude, which is a direction, or the power of the individual's relationship 
to  a  given  object ,  and  between a   value,  which  is  everything  that  is  
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desirable or  preferred.  Avi-Nun (1978) and Bar-Tal (1987) also discuss 
the  principles of positvity or preference.  The definition of values does 
not stem from a superior power but rather from society, and is connected 
to society's pressure on the individual. 
The only absolute value is the process of life itself (Dewey, 1960).  It is 
important to have the outlook according to which a value is not only what 
is desirable but what we think is also good and worthwhile, i.e., that it 
fulfills the criterion of value and also the criterion of morality.  There is 
no such thing as a real norm or an ideal norm, there is nothing normal, 
but rather normative.  Ilutz (1973) identifies the concept "values" with the 
concept of quantity, and therefore  in general, values are a process leading 
to an examination of the school's output based on values and 
merchandise.  
We see that there is no single definition for "values" (Avi-Nun, 1978), 
and every definition of value is very general and abstract (Ben-Peretz & 
Kramer, 1982). 
Values may be classified according to different fields.  Rogers (1973) 
proposes a division into operational values that are not cognitive, and 
conceptual values that include assessments regarding symbolic concepts.  
A different type of differentiation is made between content or material 
values and formational or formative values.  Content values such as 
loyalty to the homeland are absolutely clear, whereas a formative value 
such as bravery can be interpreted differently by different people 
(Kleinberger, 1961).  According to Adar (1976) every type of 
classification has some implication over moral education in school.  
Every moral perception contains two dimensions: the emotional and 
cognitive dimensions.  The  cognitive  dimension  immediately  raises the 
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question of the validity of values, since the individual must decide what 
guidelines to use to decide to prefer a given value.  The question of the 
relativity of values is concerned with the possibility of the existence of 
universal values that are not connected to a certain time and place, versus 
the argument that every value depends on a specific time, place and 
society.  Every society, whether pluralistic or not, has different moral 
perceptions and public debate regarding values.  This debate creates 
dynamics in values and then, of course, raises the question of the right to 
educate towards values.  Our generation is a generation of confusion, and 
this confusion exists in all societies (Rogers, 1973; Rotenstreich, 1964; 
Kleinberger, 1980; Lavi, 1988).  This confusion creates a need for 
agreement regarding the right to educate towards values. 
According to Kleinberger (1980) the theoretical approach that a value 
statement can be valid in one group of social circumstances but incorrect 
and invalid under different circumstances and in different societies, leads 
to relating to only some values as absolute values.  This latter type of 
values are an expression of human insight, not the insight of the 
individual but insights of humanity as a whole.  On a higher level, when 
getting to the principles of morals, their validity cannot be explained by 
rational means and therefore they must either be accepted or rejected in 
an act of faith. 
Rotenstreich opposes this approach, and his opinion, the question of 
variety of justice, equality and tolerance exist only when there is a society 
and society forces a certain form of values on the individual, controlling 
the individual's ethnocentric approach.  Regarding the issue of obligatory 
values, Rotenstreich  says   that  it  is  necessary  to  differentiate  between  
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moral principles and the interpretation of these principles in the law.  
Wright (1982) estimates that values can be eternal and universal, but their 
intentions are always changing within society. 
According to the democratic outlook the right to educate towards 
obligatory values stems from the fact that these values are accepted by 
most members of society.  In a democratic regime the majority rules and 
decides what the aims and values according to which children should be 
educated are.  According to Avi-Nun (1978) education towards values is 
not necessary, and even more so, education that is not directed toward 
cultivating the values of the individual in his social life, should not be 
called education.  It is necessary to educate towards values as a measure 
of actions or for assessment of actions.  Livingstone (1960) and 
Whitehead (1958) do not see the possibility for the existence of education 
without moral education, or as Whitehead  says,  moral education is 
impossible without a vision of greatness that turns into habit. 
Klienberger (1961) admits that in the end there is a right to educate 
towards obligatory values.  However, from a philosophical standpoint he 
argues for the lack of right to educate towards obligatory values.  
However, reality does not allow us to avoid educating towards obligatory 
values.  Therefore Rotenstreich answers him that it is obligatory for 
individuals to exist who reach a level in which they may decide between 
obligatory values.  The educator must only warn not to educate toward 
dogmatism out of belief in values and must not educate towards being 
arbitrary out of  a belief in authority.  Lamm (1986) understands that it is 
impossible to achieve the value of truth, the main value of any culture, 
without development  of  the  intellect  and formation  of character, which  
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is accomplished through education.  He agrees that there is a risk in 
education, but it is impossible to give up the risk that education towards 
values.  Although not it is not clear how the individual will choose his 
path, society must educate towards values. 
The right to educate toward values also stems from the fact that the 
school does not operate in a vacuum, and sometimes its power is weaker 
than the power of other agents.  As a remedy to this weakness 
Frankenstein (1987)  proposes principles for education towards values, 
which are mainly increasing the awareness of the individual regarding his 
weaknesses and in this way, preventing those weaknesses from taking 
over.   
In contradiction to this battery of theorists who support the right to 
educate and even the obligation to educate towards values there are a 
number of theoreticians who doubt the right of society to educate towards 
obligatory values.  The central stream of thought arguing against 
education towards value is the radical stream of education.  They place 
autonomy as the only value that society must educate towards. 
Yizhar (1975) is the most vociferous theoretician in Israel who opposes 
the right to educate towards values.  Not only does one not have to 
educate towards values, but it is also impossible to do so.  If we leave an 
uneducated child, there will be purpose to his life.  Education is from a 
position in which society wants a person to be without identity, to belong, 
at the end of the educational process, to groups even without needing 
permission to choose.  True education is the individual's freedom to live 
as well as he can, according to his personal desire, as he chooses. 
This survey of the arguments for and against education towards values 
leads to the conclusion  that this  determination will always be subjective.   
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Either the situation is created that educational action will force itself on 
the student drawing from accepted ideologies expressing society's need to 
educate the child and not the need of the child to be educated (Lamm, 
1986), or the student will first have to express his agreement so that the 
value will become obligating and therefore, there is no right to educate 
towards values (Yizhar, 1975). 
Kleinberger recommends solving this dilemma by placing responsibility 
on the individual educator and the entire system.  They must find the 
balance between reinforcing the internal confidence of the personality and 
between cultivating strength of will, to doubt and struggle with problems; 
between insurance of public unity and between encouraging the 
individuals intellectual initiative.  An additional conclusion is that it is 
necessary to change the expression of education towards values to an 
expression of education towards assessment in such a way that the 
individual learns to use consideration and to avoid propaganda and 
indoctrination. 
The School and Democratic Values
The school is very important, also because of the fact that the student who 
is in school is in the midst of critical stages of his life, the years in which 
the individual's image is formed and achieves its final form of expression.  
This is a period in which the individual leaves the protected hothouse of 
the home to the open world, where his autonomy must be allowed full 
expression.  This is a time of moral development in which opinions, 
forms of behavior and basic approaches of the individual are designed 
(Hess & Tornoy,1967; Kohlberg & Trial, 1972; ; Jennings & Niemi, 
1974). 
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The school holds a great advantage over other systems by the fact that it 
provides knowledge and skills and also serves as a tool for education 
towards values.  Therefore the school supercedes the family which cannot 
provide the individual with experiences that are suitable for becoming 
familiar with and understanding the political sphere (Driven, 1970; 
Zidkiyahu, 1988; Almond & Verba, 1963; Ichilov, 1984).  For Peters 
(1966) experience in democracy is a necessary prerequisite for the 
democratic method of government, and the entire idea of education 
towards democracy depends on this. The role of school in the process of 
education towards democracy must be emphasized, as it is the only place 
that allows such experiences. 
Sullivan et al. (1975) hypothesize that school equips the individual 
student with thinking skills and knowledge so that students can handle 
political phenomena more complexly and abstractly.  Ehman (1980) lists 
a series of studies that were conducted in the US and Canada which 
generally show the important role of the school as a socialization agent.  
This series of studies determined that knowledge is the most central thing 
the school provides to children, less than sharpening of political attitudes 
or the creation of involvement.  This is a logical finding that emphasizes 
the cognitive product of school in the United States.  Nevertheless, the 
formal educational plan helps in creating and forming attitudes and 
political awareness. Torney et al. (1975) conducted a study in ten 
countries, including the United States and Israel.  They concluded that 
school is the most important socialization agent in all areas related to 
attitudes that describe citizens or good citizenship. 
Zidkiyahu (1988) examines the way schools cope with the issue of 
democracy on two interconnected  levels.  One level is academic, through  
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specific civics curricula and through other subjects.  The other level is the 
behavioral level, which is everything defined as the covert curriculum.  
Peters (1966) proposes not to require the school to do more than it is able.  
Therefore the school must realistically examine its methods in the field of 
education towards democracy, and just do as much as it can.  Levy & 
Gutman (1974) examined a sample of 5000 secular and religious youths 
on the issue of good citizenship, before the Yom Kippur War.  They 
concluded that the school provides a possible contribution for designing 
youths' attitudes towards things that "should not be done".  83% of the 
respondents said that school should educate towards good civics, 
although most of them feel that school deals mainly with academic 
requirements.  The value of tolerance was perceived as a political value 
(Kohlberg, 1972).  The problem is that an individual cannot learn 
tolerance if he is not aware of the fact that he lacks tolerance.  Shamir & 
Sullivan (1985) examined the value of tolerance which they consider to 
be an important value, particularly in societies that are under pressure.  
They found a correlation between ideology and dogmatism and between 
tolerance. 
Ben-Peretz and Kramer (1982) found a series of problems in the field of 
realizing education towards values.  One of the problems that is raised is 
how the principle of education towards values is implemented through 
traditional curricula.  Kohlberg and Gillian (1975) are concerned by the 
fact that new curricula are based on the existence of  formal operational 
thought instead of the attempt to develop this type of thought.  Their 
recommendation is to develop curricula as tools for the development of 
moral  thought and  principles.  Howe (1987) also  shoots down curricula.   
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He feels that curricula are constructe  such that they are able to contribute  
very little in the field of education towards values.  Firer (1986) feels that 
curricula in the field of civics must go through a reform in principle and 
also structurally and qualitatively.  Civics curricula are lacking in that 
they emphasize knowledge and a description of institutions of 
government.  Frankenstein (1987) feels that instead of describing 
governmental institutions, it is necessary to deal with problems of civic 
behavior and organizational and legal questions. 
Jones (1980) criticizes the overt curriculum in Britain.  Here too he sees a 
problem of bias and a risk of indoctrination regarding a certain type of 
teacher, in the name of freedom given to them by apolitical discipline, or 
the risk that teachers will only teach facts about the system. 
A number of studies have been conducted on the impact of the Civics 
curriculum over students' political attitudes.  The assumption is that 
Civics studies should provide the ability to think critically about 
institutions, organizations and events in the sphere of society and state.  
In a large number of studies, researchers concluded that Civics courses 
led to minor changes, or to no changes at all in students' perceptions of 
democracy (Jennings & Niemi, 1974; Tap & Kohlberg, 1971; Patrick, 
1972; Sigal & Hoskin, 1981). 
Massialas (1972, 1975) criticizes the ability of curricula to change 
attitudes, showing research results from 14 countries worldwide. 
The conclusion that may be consolidated from the research itemized 
above, is that political education does have some impact in the long term 
over democratic perceptions of students.  The next chapter will attempt to 
examine the degree of impact of the Civics curriculum over attitudes of 
Druse students in Israeli high schools. 
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Good Civics
As a result of the many changes that have occurred in Israeli society, 
there has been a need for education towards good civics within the 
agenda of the educational community. 
At the beginning of 1995, the Ministry of Education appointed a steering 
committee headed by Professor Kremnitzer, of the Law Faculty of the 
Hebrew University, with the participation of Hebrew and Arab educators 
and educators from the religious-public schools.  The aim was to develop 
a comprehensive program to teach the main points of civics to students as 
a common moral and behavioral basis for all citizens of the country.  The 
committee was asked to address the following issues in its work: 
a) The civic values and civics skills that the student must acquire over the 
course of his studies; b) The civic values and skills that can be taught at 
each of the stages of learning, and inclusion of this program together with 
civics in high school; c) The organizational frameworks by which it will 
be possible to promote this program in all educational institutions in 
Israel. 
The committee presented an interim report with recommendations both in 
the theoretical educational sphere and the practical sphere.  In the 
theoretical-educational sphere, the committee touched on a variety of 
aspects of civics education, the nature of relations between citizens of the 
country, human relations between citizens, human respect and liberty, 
preventing separation and social isolation, and balancing all of the needs 
of the individual with needs of society.  The committee called to educate 
towards tolerance and recognition of pluralism.  In the practical sphere, 
the committee  addressed  the issue of  civics as a comprehensive  process  
46
composed of both theoretical study, and the acquisition of attitudes, 
values and motivation to act.  The approach that combines civics studies 
in application in the school assumes that there is no chance to teach 
attitudes by preaching or instructing.  The correct way is  through 
dialogue that will encourage students to think about the implications of 
anti-democratic attitudes over the principle of generalization and 
universalization of arguments.  Furthermore, the report called on the 
educational system to coordinate efforts that must be made 
simultaneously in the family, neighborhood, community, community 
centers, youth movements and other social organizations, in the public 
and private media, on the level of symbolism and government 
ceremonies, and on the level of the messages transmitted by the country's 
leaders. 
It may be said that the Kremnitzer report discussed a serious and 
comprehensive change in Civics education, including, among other 
things, an increased schedule of studies in Civics, a new curriculum, and 
teacher training, but its main innovation was recognition that success in 
education towards democratic citizenship depends on a comprehensive 
educational procedure spread among all areas of learning, including the 
development of a proper climate in the school allowing students to 
continually experience civic values and internalize them, experiencing 
civics skills. 
The present dissertation aims to investigate how school promotes 
education towards good civics. 
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Citizenship and its Connection to Education
In order to be able to determine measures for examining the issue and 
assessing it, I will first  address the definition of the  concept  
"citizenship" and its development into  the attributes of  good   citizenship  
and  the connection  between  education  and  civics. 
The concept of citizenship is a complex term that includes many 
dimensions within the collective and personal spheres.  The term has 
different meanings, reflecting different uses. 
First of all, it is a concrete empirical and descriptive term, in that 
citizenship relates to a series of particular obligations and rights given to 
citizens in a certain country.  Second of all,  citizenship may be 
considered an analytical term, in that citizenship includes the protection 
that the country provides to its citizens and the opportunities that it 
creates for them in the realm of political participation (Janowitz, 1980). 
However, the many changes that human society has been through and is 
going through have led to changes in the meaning, complexity and 
attributes of the concept.  Citizenship has been a continual human social 
need for the past 2500 years, since the times of Ancient Greece 
developing through the era of the modern national state.  Good citizens 
must be people who want to act in a way that will lead to benefit for their 
community, that will make them good citizens (Oliver & Heather, 1994).  
According to Janowitz (1980) citizenship is a moral judgment.  In order 
to be called a good citizen, the individual must judge the morality of his 
personal behavior.  This hints that the individual must ensure his 
cooperative interest and its welfare.  Macedo (1990) argues that good 
citizenship is expressed in  reasonable participation in civic activity, signs  
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of tolerance and respect for others' rights, and self control.  Petten (1988, 
in Oliver & Heather, 1994) also defines the concept similarly.  However, 
he  places  more  emphasis  on  involvement  to improve community  life.   
Levinston (in Lamm, 1963) argues that good citizenship is more than 
participating in elections, paying taxes and fulfilling national obligations.  
It also involves all activities that the individual performs relating to his 
fellow citizens, and which affect the health and normal running of the 
country.  Good citizenship includes all of the requirements of the law, but 
also many obligations that are not demanded, and are up to the 
individual's discretion.  Good citizenship is practical and not theoretical, 
active and not passive, an art and not theory.  It is the art of living within 
society.  A good citizen is like a good soldier, learning to feel and to act 
as an organ of a living body.  He participates in this body and when 
necessary sacrifices his private welfare and sometimes his life.  The 
citizen fulfills his obligations to his country out of free will and not 
coercion (Heather, 1990). 
The literature review allows derivation of the general assumption of the 
present dissertation, that citizenship is the legal connection of the 
individual to his country and land, a connection that is determined 
through obligations and rights towards the country.  Citizenship is 
connected to common history and shared symbols, such as an anthem and 
a flag, and depends on a political institutional infrastructure and a social-
cultural infrastructure.  Citizenship includes three clusters of rights: 
1) rights necessary for individual freedom such as the right to a just trial 
and freedom of opinion and belief; 
2) political   rights,   the  main   ones  being  the  right   of  the   citizen  to   
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participate  in the  governing  of  the country;  
3) a group of social-economic rights including among other things, the 
right to receive services in education, health,  and residence, social 
services, welfare services, and the right to hold property.  In addition, the 
citizen must be subordinate to the authority of the state. 
There is a connection between education and citizenship which is 
expressed in two main aspects: the need to teach the necessary skills for 
active and responsible civil life and the need for maintaining the strength 
of the democratic regime. 
Theoretical debate regarding the connection between education and 
citizenship is ancient and has been going on since the days of the Ancient 
Greek philosophers.  The Greek philosopher Plato wrote: "What we have 
in our thought is education from childhood towards values, training that 
creates a strong desire to become perfect citizens".  Aristotle believed that 
the individual is naturally constructed to live in political communities, but 
this natural potential must be designed by the cooperative and educational 
influence that create the true citizen (Heather, 1990; Oliver & Heather, 
1994).  In the early modern age, Machiavelli and Rousseau both 
recognized the importance of education in increasing civic spirit.  
Rousseau saw a goal of education towards citizenship as habituating 
citizens to upholding laws, equality, brotherhood, competition, and living 
according to the outlook of brother citizens, desiring public consensus.  
Heather (1990) argues that the differences that citizenship includes much 
be learned and become part of culture. Therefore no one can be a full 
citizen without being educated for the role. 
Lamm (1992) argues that in order to be a citizen in a democratic society it  
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is necessary to learn, and this  does not mean  cognitive recognition of the 
laws of democracy, but rather the formation of characteristics, i.e. 
educating the personality.  This is out of the assumption that positive 
experience in school accompanied by internalization of values, will lead 
to applying this experience in adult life (Peters, 1983). 
Neuberger (1992) emphasizes the importance of experience and learning 
and argues that it is not possible to develop a democratic personality that 
is not tolerant, moderate, compromising, and having social trust.  These 
attributes are learned in the educational system.  Since democracy is more 
than a form of government it is a way of life,  it is acquired through an 
educational process of combined experiences (Dewey, 1960).  Only a 
methodical educational process can teach the necessary skills for complex 
life in democratic society, such as the ability to make rational decisions, 
to choose between alternatives and to accept personal responsibility 
(Damico, 1980; Gruber, 1971). 
Lindman (1956, in: Zidkiyahu, 1986) found that attitudes of youth 
towards democracy are emotional and include the component of social 
desirability.  On the other hand, arguments against democracy are more 
rational.  This finding is in keeping with other findings that indicate a 
non-uniform perception of democratic principles.  On one hand, most 
youngsters express a positive attitude towards democracy in general, and 
they have internalized democracy as majority rule.  On the other hand, 
when asked to express their opinions regarding specific democratic 
values, they tend to have reservations regarding democracy as the 
preferred way of life or limit it with reservations regarding some 
democratic values (Levy, Rapaport & Rimor, 1978; Zemach & Zin, 1984;  
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Hasin, 1984; Ichilov, Bartal & Mazaway, 1987; The Van Lear Institute, 
1987; Almog, 1990; Zellman & Sears, 1973). 
Additional studies have discovered an ethnocentric trend regarding 
willingness to apply full civic rights; difficulty applying the principles of 
democracy universally   in problematic situations; and a low level of 
tolerance   which   focuses  mainly  on  various  groups  such   as   groups  
identified with the left and Arabs in Israel (Ichilov, Bartal & Mazaway, 
1987; Zemach, 1986; Shamir & Sullivan, 1985).  Furthermore findings of 
studies that examined civic orientations in Israel were partially 
encouraging and partially worrying.  Many educators found a high 
frequency of collectivist and nationalistic orientations among youths in 
different groups within Israel, expressed in  attitudes of respect to the 
nation and the homeland, justification of the existence of the state, a 
desire to live in the state, a desire to act for the state's security, and a 
desire to volunteer to the army (Levy & Gutman, 1976; Adler & Peres, 
1968 in: Ichilov, 1995; Ichilov, Hyman & Shapira, 1988).  Alongside 
these findings, other studies report a weakening of the connection to the 
collective which emphasizes the benefit of the group, and a rise in the 
importance of orientations that  give preference to achievement and 
personal success.  An example of this can be found in studies that 
reported mixed morals regarding leaving the country, making leaving the 
country into a partially legitimate step when the aim is personal success 
and promotion of the individual (Etzioni-Halevi & Shapira, 1974; in 
Ichilov, 1989 ). 
The studies surveyed above indicate that, in fact, most respondents 
express  a  positive  attitude  towards  democracy  and  consider  it  to  the  
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preferred method of government.  However, this has not been sufficiently 
internalized, perceiving democracy as a method of rule that centers on the  
Individual   who is  free  to  design  and  develop   his  personality   as  an  
individual within society, while protecting the rights of various groups 
within society.  Furthermore a weakness was seen in internalizing 
universal  values  as expressed, among  other   things in attitudes  towards  
Arabs, Ultra-Orthodox, and  freedom  of  expression and  freedom  of  the  
press. 
Education is one of the basic values of a democratic philosophy which 
supports equality of all citizens in all areas of life, including equal 
opportunities in education, which aims to allow every individual in 
society to develop and realize his full hidden potential.  Education 
towards citizenship in a democracy is necessary for the existence of the 
democracy, as only with the aid of a methodical educational process can 
the complex skills necessary for living an active and responsible civilian 
life in a democratic society be taught (Cohen, Shmida & Zidkiyahu, 
1985). 
Based on research findings, Kremnitzer (1996) sees a great need for 
comprehensive education towards citizenship as an important and first 
degree factor behind ensuring the strength and quality of the democratic 
regime while creating commitment of citizens towards the democratic 
idea and creating willingness among citizens to be active responsible 
citizens.  The correlation between democracy and education has often 
been perceived as a correlation between democracy and school although 
democracy is only part of the educational process in general, and part of 
the  process  of  education  towards  citizenship  that  occurs,  not  only  in  
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school.   The reasons for the correlation between democracy education 
and  school  are  complex  and   are  related  to,  among  other  things,  the 
centrality  of school in society, and the correlation between education and 
democracy.  The school is the central factor behind the educational 
process towards citizenship and democracy, as school places 
responsibility for training the younger generation to live in a democratic 
society, on the school (Hess & Horney, 1967; Peled, 1976). 
School and Society
The basic role of school is socialization.  Socialization towards 
citizenship in a democratic society aims to help the individual adopt 
norms and values that are accepted in society.  As part of this role, the 
school must provide the child with civic knowledge, so that he will be 
able to take part in government and fulfill his civic roles, equipping the 
student with tools allowing him to examine events, attitudes and 
information that flow through a democratic society.  Since school 
represents society or part of it, it is given the role of training the younger 
generation for readiness to enter adult society, with all of its obligations, 
and with basic skills that will help the individual fit into society and 
contribute to its stability in the future.  Commitment means accepting 
values of society at large and taking a certain defined part in society.  
Within the socialization process the school provides youngsters with 
knowledge, values of the community in which they live, social behavioral 
patterns, and ideals that are vital for fulfilling their roles in adult society, 
both regarding motivation necessary for fulfilling these roles, and 
regarding  technical  knowledge  necessary  for these roles (Parson, 1959;  
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Peters, 1966; Kneller, 1970; Hern, 1990; Fishman, 1978). 
Bitwill (1965) considers the school to be a social unit which was given 
the   role   of  providing  a  service,   in  this   case   moral   and   technical 
socialization of youngsters.  This assumption means that the central goal 
of the school is to prepare students for status as adults through providing 
knowledge, skills and practice of moral attributes that are necessary for 
adult roles.  Furthermore, the school must teach its students a basic level 
of civic skills that   will include, among  other  things  knowledge  and  
abilities to  make  laws common to adult society in general.  Two main 
sociological  theories  present  the correlation between school and society. 
1. The Functional Theory -  
This theory was developed by Kerr, Clark and Parsons and argues that 
education in school is an effective and rational means for choosing 
talented people and their choices.  In other words, schools help the 
creation of equal opportunity society in which effort and ability determine 
the individual's status more than family background.  The function that 
the school fulfills, based on the functional theory is, the creation of 
intellectual skills, classification and choosing skills, and consolidation of 
citizenship based on knowledge.  According to the functional theory, 
schools create what may be generally called modern attitudes and values.  
The school teaches qualities and very general attitudes that help in 
performing effective roles in modern society.  Therefore, the school's 
main contribution is learning social norms that the family is unable to 
transmit (Dreebin, 1968; Parsons, 1959).  The school transmits 
situationally      dependent    standards    of    behavior,    i.e.,    principles,  
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assumptions  or  expectations  that  show  how  an  individual  should  act  
under defined conditions.  The school contributes to learning norms and 
their nature, and in this way prepares the student to enter the adult world. 
2. The Critical Theory -  
This theory emphasizes the connection between schools and the demands 
of elitist social groups, and not the needs of society in general.  
Furthermore, this theory emphasizes the connection between school 
education and obedience and submission more than the acquisition of 
cognitive  skills . Therefore,  this  theory  considers  the  school  to  be  an  
institution that serves the interests of elitist social groups that maintain 
inequality and cultivate attitudes that encourage accepting the given 
situation (Hern, 1990).  The central idea behind the theory of Bowles and 
Gintis is that schools serve the interest of a capitalistic order in modern 
society.  Schools reproduce values and personal attitudes that are 
necessary in a repressive capitalist society.  Schools must control students 
and make them submit to ensure the existence of an effective disciplined 
work force, and in this way they encourage passive and uncritical 
citizenship.  Similarly, Randel and Collins argue that from a historical 
standpoint, the main function of the school has been to teach the culture 
of status groups more than to teach useful skills.  Most schools in most 
societies are given the task of transmitting ideal values and measures of a 
certain social group, generally the ruling group or the elite group within 
society (Hern, 1990). 
In conclusion, it maybe concluded from sociological theories that schools 
basically  provide  narrow training  for the  role  of a citizen, emphasizing  
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the formal aspects of the structure of government and attributing more 
importance to the passive dimensions of the role of the citizen, without 
cultivating students' abilities to cope with complex reality.  School in a 
democratic society must  provide students  with all the components of the 
role of the citizen.  Students must be trained to cope with possible 
conflicts within and between the roles of being a citizen in order to be 
able to decide between alternatives in a mature and autonomous manner.  
The school's obligation is to expose citizens of the future to a series of 
models of democratic citizenship so that they may choose the most 
appropriate model for themselves (Ichilov, 1993; Ben Amotz, 1987; Wyn, 
1995; Benjamin Paul, 1997). 
The School as a Central Agent of Education Towards Citizenship
A number of socialization agents participate in the process of education 
towards citizenship and formation of a political orientation in a 
democratic society: the family, the school, the peer group, and the media; 
despite recognition that these agents' roles are important in teaching 
values of democracy and political awareness, particularly the family 
(Ichilov, 1984; Hyman, 1959; Jennings & Niemi, 1968; Zellman & Sears, 
1971; Niemi, 1973). 
Many researchers emphasize the central role of the school in the process 
of educating towards citizenship in a democratic society.  The centrality 
of the school in Israel in the above mentioned process is more obvious 
than in other countries because of the role that school plays in 
consolidating the heterogeneous population of Israeli society and because 
of  the  weakness of many  families in Israel as socialization agents (Adar,  
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1953).  The centrality of the school is even more obvious in light of the 
growing weakness of youth movements beginning in the 1960s, which 
were not a central factor anymore in educating children toward 
citizenship and a political orientation within democratic society (Barzel, 
1974). 
Many researchers emphasize the central role of the school in the 
educational process toward citizenship in democratic society.  One of the 
main reasons for this is the school's ability, with the tools it has at hand, 
to create a socialization process that is suitable with its nature.  The role 
of the school stems from other causes.  The school is the educational arm 
of the country.  It is able to be influenced.  It has professional staff and 
they have tools and educational programs.  Actually the school plays a 
role in providing attitudes, social perceptions and beliefs regarding the 
activity of the political method (Hess & Thorney, 1967). 
The school is a system that is more given to central control and direction 
than other socialization systems.  A uniform curriculum may be 
determined, or it may be ensured that only certain types of people with 
specific ideological orientations are trained to work at schools (Ichilov, 
1984; Peters, 1979 in: Zidkiyahu, 1988).  Weisberg (1974 in Ichilov, 
1984) argues that despite the infrastructure of family influence which the 
student brings to school, the school can redesign social and political 
attitudes.  The school represents a miniature society that is parallel in 
structure to broader society, and therefore for every area of life in society, 
there is a parallel area of life in school. Therefore, the school can be a 
workshop for experiences that typify civic life in society.  Active student 
communities can be  developed in which members learn to live as citizens  
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with rights and obligations (Dewey, 1960; Eyler, 1977).  Despite general 
agreement regarding the main status of the school in political education, 
various research results that are concerned with the influence of schools 
over youths' attitudes towards the political system and civic orientations, 
are not unequivocal.  Hess & Horney (1967) point out the difficulty in 
measuring the impact of schools, as students are given to a wide variety 
of influences from other entities, such as: family, the media, and peer 
group. These may neutralize the influence of school somewhat. 
Researchers who consider school to be the main agents of political 
education base themselves of the fact that there is a correlation between 
years of education and knowledge, attitudes and patterns of behavior in 
the political sphere.  Among other things, it has been found that political 
knowledge, political interest, trust in people, and volunteer activity in 
public and political organizations, all rise with a rise in the number of 
years of education (Hess & Thorney, 1967; Dreeben, 1970).      
As previously mentioned most researchers support the approach that 
emphasizes the important role of the school in the political education 
process.  Even researchers who do not clearly indicate the school as a 
central factor in this process testify to its importance.  This importance is 
based on viewing the school as representing a direct and conscious effort 
of society to teach the younger generation cultural heritage.  Schools cope 
with the issue of education towards democracy on the intellectual 
academic plane, through programs that are taught in various lessons.  
Furthermore they cope on the behavioral plane through an attempt to 
invite opportunities for students in civic processes and a democratic life, 
through creating a democratic civic  climate in the  school.  Topics related  
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to education towards citizenship in democratic society that are expressed 
in all lessons concerning the social sciences and particularly History and 
Civics studies can be a source of information and also a method of 
education towards active citizenship.  This information will be a basis for 
good civics (Hepburn, 1983; Beck, 1992; Lipset, 1972). 
Researchers who examined Civics curricula and study materials in the 
United  States  found  that  they are  not  suited to  achieving  the  aims of 
 civics education because they emphasize the structural and legislative 
aspects of government and do not encourage criticism and independent 
thought.  They avoid touching on controversial issues (Jennings & Niemi, 
1968;   Massialas, 1972).  A number of researchers who examined the 
impact of curricula over civics education concluded that their contribution 
to citizenship is low.  Remy (1972) who examined the correlation 
between education and democracy and between curricula taught to 
graduates of American schools  when  they  were  students, found  that  
40-60%  of  the graduates indicated that the subjects they learned in 
school were not relevant to reality, did not include new knowledge in the 
social sciences sphere, did not discuss controversial issues, did not 
compare democratic regimes to other political methods, and did not 
provide practical skills necessary for a citizen in democratic society. 
Other studies show that the subjects learned in Civics lessons have only a 
small impact over students' knowledge of political issues, their political 
attitudes and their social behavior (Patrick, 1988; Langton & Jennings, 
1968; Elam, 1984).  
Ichilov (1984) reported that American researchers (Tap, 1971; Patrick, 
1972)  concluded  that  although  Civics  lessons are  supposed to  provide  
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abilities for analyzing legal,  moral and public problems, their 
contribution in this context is slim.  Wyn (1995) argues that the 
contribution of Civics lessons in their current format is small because 
education towards citizenship focuses on providing formal and apolitical 
information, cultivation of the image of a loyal, passive citizen who 
perceives his rights as a citizen as limited, and the main role of the citizen 
as being one  who  obeys  laws.  These  research  findings  encourage  the  
question: Is it possible to educate towards citizenship in a democracy 
using school curricula and study materials? 
Researchers disagree regarding this question.  Some argue that education 
toward citizenship in a democracy cannot occur solely through 
educational curricula (Hess, 1968; Thorney, Oppenheim & Farnen, 1975).  
On the other hand, Kohlberg (1970) argues that the student can use 
principles that he learns about democracy in order to address practical 
political questions, assuming the study material also contains  experiential  
elements such as problem solving, decision making and role playing.  
Schools in Israel, like in many other countries, cope with the issue of 
education towards citizenship on two planes: the academic-intellectual 
plane, which addresses direct learning of topics concerning education 
towards citizenship; and the behavioral plane, which includes social 
activities and extra-curricular activities through school.  The Civics 
curriculum (for example, those of 1968, 1971, and 1985) presented these 
two planes alongside each other.  On the intellectual plane emphasis is 
placed on understanding the main idea behind democracy.  On the 
behavioral plane, emphasis is on the process of choosing events in 
students'  lives according to  the  values  of democracy,  and applying  the  
61
principles of democracy in the field of informal education both in school 
and in students' social lives.  The issues related to education towards 
citizenship in a democracy are expressed in most subjects studied in 
Israeli schools, in History, Geography, Literature and Civics (Ichilov, 
1988).  Addressing these issues takes place in homeroom classes also,  
where academic and behavioral planes are addressed simultaneously, and 
also  sometimes through applying unique curricula addressing education 
towards democracy and political education (Ministry of Education and 
Culture, 1985, 1992). 
The main study topics that should reinforce civics education are social 
studies and history lessons.  Curricula and study materials reflect the 
social "credo" regarding the essence of citizenship in a democracy. 
The stated aim of Civics studies is increasing knowledge regarding 
political institutes and procedures, education towards loyalty, active 
citizenship and participation, and increasing individual awareness 
regarding  civic  obligations and  rights of  oneself and  others (Ministry 
of Education, 1971, 1986, 1994). Within the framework of social  studies,  
goals have been set similar to those in Civics studies.  Among other 
things, these goals include: familiarity with ideological approaches that 
could help understand the State of Israel as a democratic country, 
familiarity with the individual's ability to affect what occurs in the state; 
openness and tolerance towards other opinions, showing a positive 
attitude towards the values of democracy while developing a critical 
approach towards what occurs; and willingness to fulfill obligations as a 
citizen, along with standing up for one's rights (Ministry of Education and 
Culture, 1985).  Within the framework of History studies, aims have been  
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determined regarding education towards democracy as cultivating 
understanding and tolerance towards the feelings, traditions and way of 
life of other people and nations, and cultivating the ability to judge 
historical events based on general human moral values.  Furthermore, the 
various meanings of the values of freedom and equality are examined in 
various cultures, along with attempts to fulfill these values in reality in 
various ways (Ministry of Education and Culture, 1985).  Despite the 
centrality of the issue of education towards citizenship and democracy in 
various curricula, it seems that their application in the educational system 
comes up short .  This critique  addresses  various aspects  of the  process.   
However, the current survey will focus on topics and study materials that 
are part of the formal Civics curricula, based on their connection to the 
topic of the present dissertation, and based on the fact that these are the 
central tool for providing knowledge, skills and values to the younger 
generation (Ichilov, 1988).  The government-run nature of schools in 
Israel has been neutralized from any political connection, and the desire 
to emphasize what unifies and is common has been expressed in 
education towards citizenship and social education in general.  An 
analysis of the study materials dealing with education towards citizenship 
in a democracy shows that there is broad agreement within the public that 
one must discuss social issues in principle and abstractly avoiding their 
concrete representations, particularly those that are controversial (Ichilov, 
1988; Firer, 1987; Yuval, 1984). 
In recent years, there has been a growing trend towards openness in 
presenting a broader variety of issues in the curriculum, such as: Jewish-
Arab  relations;  religious-secular  relations,  etc. (Ichilov & Naveh, 1979;  
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Ichilov, 1984).  However, in a study conducted by Ichilov (1986) among 
civics and social science teachers in high school,  teachers were asked to 
cite the issues that are emphasized and neglected in civics education.  It 
was found that teachers emphasized topics that represented the structural 
legal aspect of government such as government, courts and the voting 
method.  Neglected topics represented universal values such as: tolerance, 
equality of the sexes, keeping the law, and also nationalistic aspects such 
as love of the nation and land, absorbing immigration, and respect for the 
symbol, flag and anthem.  Only 23% of the teachers asked agreed 
absolutely with the statement that Civics textbooks are suited to the needs 
of Civics education.  Only 29% of the teachers agreed partially.   
A number of studies have examined the impact of unique curricula 
regarding democracy, education towards democracy and peaceful 
coexistence that are taught in schools.  Studies have found that either 
these curricula do not affect the students' attitudes towards the subjects or 
that they slightly increase the students' degree of tolerance (Dahaf 
Institute and Van Lear Institute, 1987; Harel, 1994). 
These research findings, like the findings of previously conducted 
research in other countries, raise the question, too: Is it possible to 
provide education towards citizenship in a democracy using study 
materials and curricula?  The behavioral plane of the school is the 
accepted sphere for social education, or social moral education.  This also 
includes the emotional plane.  Social education addresses all events 
occurring in school and is a factor behind determining the educational 
social climate of the school.  Within this realm, it supports providing all 
students    with   opportunities   to   belong   to   social   frameworks  on  a  
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democratic basis (Shmida, 1979).  Israeli researchers, similarly to their 
colleagues in other countries, found that there is a correlation between 
democratic experiences occurring in schools and between the attitudes of 
students regarding democracy.  Zidkiyahu (1988) found differences 
between students on the student council and students who were not, with 
regards to their attitudes towards democracy in society and toward 
democracy in school.  Students within the student council had more 
positive attitudes. 
In contrast to the above, Goldberg (1998) found that there was no 
difference in the knowledge and attitudes of students learning in a 
democratic  school  toward  democracy  and that of  students  who did not  
learn in democratic schools, because in both cases, students presented 
positive attitudes towards democracy. 
These findings may testify that experiencing a democratic way of life 
does not necessarily develop more general democratic attitudes, only 
democratic attitudes in specific areas.  On the other hand, in schools in 
which there is no democratic experience, schools still manage to present 
the importance of democracy and develop positive attitudes in general 
among the students.  
Despite the findings noted above, researchers in Israel have drawn 
conclusions regarding the importance of the existence of a democratic 
civic climate in schools.  It is an inseparable part of education towards 
citizenship in a democratic society (Zidkiyahu, 1986, 1988; Goldberg, 
1988; Ichilov, 1984; Schmuck & Shmuck, 1978).  This conclusion is in 
keeping with the official position of the Ministry of Education, that 
developing  and cultivating  a democratic  citizen  will be  done  not  only  
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through learning democracy but also through applying it in practice 
(Ministry of Education, 1985, 1997). 
In conclusion, school is perceived as the main agent of education towards 
citizenship and as representing the purposeful and conscious efforts of 
society to teach cultural heritage to students.  This perception of the 
school is common to all societies.  Schools are agents of social, civic, 
moral and theoretical training.  They create commitment to values of 
work life and social values in the adult world.  The content of education 
covers all aspects of culture and serves the goals of the entire 
socialization process (Brubacher, 1965; Shifman, 1978). 
The central role of school in the process of educating towards citizenship 
in a democratic society stems from many reasons.  The main reason is the 
 fact that school is a miniature social framework (Dewey, 1960), which 
contains all of the attributes of civic and political life within society.  
Education towards citizenship in school takes place on two planes: the 
academic plane and the behavioral plane. 
In 1995, The Minister of Education appointed the Kremnitzer committee 
with the aim of developing a comprehensive program for teaching 
citizenship to  students as a moral and  behavioral  basis that is common 
to all citizens of the state (Kremnitzer, 1996).  The committee determined 
the civic values and skills that students should develop over the course of 
their studies.  In 2000, the Department of Curricula of the Ministry of 
Education published a new Civics textbook, "Being Citizens in Israel". 
The book was written in accordance with the recommendations of the 
Kremnitzer committee in all areas regarding study content.  It is a book 
used by all  students in  high schools  in Jewish,  Arab and Druse schools.   
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The aim is to create a common denominator for all students who study in 
the educational system and are going to be adult citizens in Israel, as 
stated in the Kremnitzer report. 
Education towards citizenship and democracy plays a central role in the 
worldview of Israeli society and the Israeli educational system.  In the 
early years after the founding if the state, education towards citizenship 
and democracy was already perceived as one of the two main goals of 
Israeli society (Adar, 1953).  The nature of citizenship studies in Israel 
has been affected by public debate and Israeli reality in various eras.  
Over the years, efforts have been made by the educational system to 
strengthen education towards citizenship and democracy in schools, 
whether in social education or as part of the curriculum.  The most recent 
 significant expression of the importance of this issue in the educational 
system was in the appointment of the Kremnitzer committee in 1995 with 
the aim of creating a comprehensive program for teaching citizenship.  
The recommendations of the committee that were presented in 1996 were 
adopted fully by the Ministry of Education, and the conclusions are 
expressed in instructions given by the Ministry to all schools, both as 
regards social education and the Civics curriculum.
Despite the importance attributed to developing a civic climate and 
creating democratic experiences in schools in the conclusions of the 
Kremnitzer committee and documents of the Ministry of Education, and 
despite the trend of schools in recent years to cultivate a civic climate and 
allow democratic experiences within school walls, studies that have 
examined the issue  discovered  that schools  educate  towards  obedience  
And  discipline,  and  do  not  operate  democratically.   In  light  of  these  
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findings, and based on the centrality of education towards citizenship and 
democracy in the educational system, there is a strong need to examine 
how the school educates towards and promotes civic education and 
education towards good citizenship specifically. 
Peace
The peace process with the Palestinians has been long and tiring, and has 
lasted for many years already.  The first real step that created a window of 
hope was the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993.  From that point in 
time, negotiations have been taking place between the Israelis and 
Palestinians, despite many crises.  Each of the sides is convinced that it is 
doing  its best to  achieve a final  resolution of the conflict which will end  
in a permanent agreement.  It is always felt that it is the other side that is 
creating barriers in the process.  Each side attempts to broadcast interest 
in peace, but what do they mean when they say "peace"? 
The research literature that addresses the perception of the concept of 
peace identifies different meanings and perceptions for this term 
(Hakvoort & Oppenheimer, 1998).  One of the most common 
discernments  made has been between perceiving peace as a positive 
peace and perceiving  peace as a negative peace.  A positive peace means 
a form of harmonious cooperation between groups or nations.  Negative 
peace means defining peace through negativity - a lack of escalation and 
a lack of physical violence between groups or nations.  Oboodait (1993) 
adds that negative peace is not a solution to existing problems on earth, as 
they  are composed  of a  variety of cultures,  races, nations,  religions and  
economic difficulties.  On the other hand, positive peace means the ability  
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to live together by valuing and accepting all races and cultures. 
Galtung (1985) and Brock-Utne (1985) presented a different outlook that 
relates to indirect violence versus direct violence.  From this viewpoint, 
positive peace is defined as the lack of indirect violence (injustice, 
inequality, etc.) among individuals or organized groups.  Negative peace 
is defined as a lack of direct organized or unorganized violence (generally 
war).  In addition to the definitions of peace as presented until now, it is 
possible to address two further components of the concept, attitudes 
toward it, and willingness to give up something for it.  Attitudes towards 
peace can be more or less positive, optimistic or pessimistic.  This is also 
true of willingness to give up things and compromise.  There are those 
who are wiling to give up more, and there are those who are not willing to  
give up anything or to comprise at all.  In the study conducted by Ichilov  
and Masaway (1994) regarding adolescents' perceptions of peace, it was 
found that Israeli Jews show a more positive attitude towards peace than 
Israeli Arabs, and also tend to agree to more compromise and sacrifice for 
peace than Israeli Arabs. 
Factors Affecting the Perception of the Peace Concept
Studies concerning the perception of peace in the past focused mainly on 
developmental  changes  occurring  in  understanding  the concept  during  
childhood and adolescence.  Hakvoort & Oppenheimer (1993) note in 
their study that they expected understanding of peace to develop with age 
from a personal level (egocentric) to a general level (collectivist).  But 
research   findings  indicate  that   adolescents  also   consider  peace  on a  
personal level.  The study found that the general level develops with age, 
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but does not replace the personal level, it combines with it.  Furthermore, 
they hypothesized the perception of the concept of peace would be more 
abstract as the age of the respondents rose, i.e., there would be a transition 
from the concrete (acceptance, patience) to the abstract (universal rights).  
This hypothesis was not supported in their research as they found that 
abstract joins concrete and does not replace it.  They also found that from 
age eight, most children understand peace as a lack of war and a lack of 
fighting (warlike acts) on a collective level.  Children who did not show 
this pattern (generally under age eight) either did not understand the 
concept of peace or could not express it in words.  However, it was noted 
that from the moment the child begins to understand the concept of peace, 
it is generally understood as a lack of war. 
In recent years, focus has begun on cultural and situational influences 
over the perception of peace, war and conflict (Raviv et al., 1998).  Based 
on research and theory in the field, it is possible to discern three groups of 
factors affecting individuals' perceptions of peace: 
1. Historical narrative and social beliefs created within the historical 
framework. 
2. The unique situation in which the individual lives. 
3. Specific educational experiences of the individual within society. 
These  factors affect the  creation of  social knowledge.  This knowledge 
is created and acquired by members of a given society as a result of its 
history, conditions and special experiences.  This knowledge may be 
maintained over many generations and does not easily change (Raviv et 
al., 1998).  It  provides  society  with a common  basis for  interaction and  
communication,  as members  of a  given  society who grow up in a given  
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culture maintain many common beliefs.  Furthermore, it allows mutual 
dependency and creates a common social identity.  Therefore, the 
individual's opinions are affected, among other things, by the opinions of 
the social and cultural environment in which he lives. 
Collective narrative is actually the story of the history of a society as 
society views the story to be.  It is a detailed story designed by ideologists 
or politicians, philosophers and educators to create some form of logic in 
the story of the past, to draw conclusions regarding the future (Sirkka, 
1999).  This narrative includes events unique to a specific society, such as 
war, conflict and peace which are strong central experiences with decisive 
effects over society.  However, every society presents these concepts 
differently   according  to  its own  specific   experiences  and  conditions.  
(Cooper, 1998, 1999).  In addition to the fact that the narrative 
encompasses a broad range of concepts that relate to special events, it 
includes an integrated group of social beliefs related to the collective, to 
enemies, to goals, etc.  As the present research examines the perceptions 
of Israeli Druze youth regarding peace, we will focus on Druze beliefs 
related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
Societies in a state of conflict develop special social beliefs in order to 
create vital psychological conditions for better coping with the conflict 
(Bar-Tal, 1998a, 1998b, 1999). These  psychological   conditions  include  
dedication to society and the land, high motivation to contribute, 
perseverance under physical and psychological pressure, willingness to 
sacrifice, unity, solidarity, maintaining society's aims, dedication bravery 
and   the  ability  to  suffer.   Social   beliefs  are  acquired  through  social  
institutions (educational systems). 
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De-legitimization of others:  Jews see Arab society as inhuman.  Arabs 
are perceived as murderers, terrorists, unreliable, primitive, and as lacking 
value for human life (Bar-Tal, 1994, 1995; Bar, Gal & Bar, 1996).  In the 
same way, Arabs perceive Jews as cruel murderers, haters (Harkavi, 
1967), infidels, traitors, sly, aggressive, avaricious, racist (Harkavi, 1971; 
Sharon, 1997),  controlling and acting unjustly (Bar, Gal & Bar, 1996). 
Positive self image: Every society sees itself as primary and just.  The 
Jews of Israel perceive their actions as positive and explain their negative 
actions as a necessity of reality.  They consider them to be less negative 
than the acts of Arabs (Bar Tal, 1994, 1995).  Arabs note that in the past 
they acted fairly towards the Jews, and their later aggression began as a 
result of the Jews occupation of the land.  Violent acts are only a response  
to Israeli conquest and terror (Harkavi, 1967, 1971). 
Image of the victim:  Jews who have experienced difficult experiences 
throughout years in the Diaspora, have developed a belief common to 
Jewish society in Israel, which is "everyone is against us" (Bar Tal, 1994, 
1995).  On the other hand, Arabs see themselves as the victims of Israeli 
conquest in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Firer and Aduan, 1997; Bar-
Tal & Rouhana, 1998). 
Peace as a desire for the future, setting peace as an aim providing 
optimism:  Jews  have  set  peace  as a   social  goal.  On   the other  hand,  
among the Arabs at first the perception was of destroying Israel with no 
possibility for finding a peaceful solution (because that would mean 
recognizing the State of Israel).  Over the years there has been a shift in 
Palestinian    attitudes,   apparently   because   of   their   recognition   that  
destroying Israel is not possible.  Today, their outlook is "land for peace",  
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i.e., willingness to achieve peace if Israel will withdraw from the 
territories occupied in 1967 (Giladi, 1997). 
The educational system as a tool for transmitting social narrative and 
beliefs:  The educational system is a central socialization agent through 
which social beliefs, attitudes and values (cultural and interpersonal) are 
transmitted (Bar-Tal & Zoltek, 1989).  This is conducted mainly through 
school which is the central socialization agent (Pasternak & Zidkiyahu, 
194), which in democratic regimes, is also considered to be an institute 
through which national narratives and political orientations of society are 
transmitted (Bar-Tal & Zoltek, 1989).  One way that school does this is 
through formal education: curricula and textbooks.  Furthermore, school 
contributes to forming individual behavior in interpersonal relations and 
relations   between   social  groups , ethnic  groups  and   national   groups 
 (Levin, 1994).  Proof of the fact that the educational system is a pipeline 
for transmission and cultivation of beliefs, attitudes and values is that 
when reality changes or there is a need to prepare for a new reality, there 
is an immediate need to change curricula and study materials (Firer & 
Aduan, 1997; Pasternak & Zidkiyahu, 1994). 
Regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the peace process occurring 
presently, the educational system in Israel is reorganizing both regarding 
values  and  beliefs   that  it  had   previously  taught, and regarding  study  
material that assisted this process.  Until recently, education towards 
values included spiritual guidelines for Israeli society, such as values 
related to physical power, force, military supremacy, commitment to the 
state.  Emphasis  was placed  on  belief  in  "purity of the weapon" ,  "it is  
good  to  die  for  our  country",  "the  world  is  against us",  etc. (Degani,  
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1994).  Slowly, over the years, a number of these values have been 
undermined as a result of a changing reality.  Now there is a perceptual 
change occurring.  For example, the existence of the state is possible not 
only through force but also through peaceful methods.  This is a different 
more open, accepting way of thought where yesterday's enemy is today's 
partner (Degani, 1994).  Furthermore, the Palestinians are also 
reassessing their educational system.  Until now they tended to teach in 
their schools based on Jordanian and Egyptian textbooks.  Now they use 
their own books that present their own unique state, suited to the new 
reality that has been created. 
The impact of collective narrative over perception of the concept of 
peace:  Ecworth et al. (1998)  based their studies on the assumption that 
adolescents' perceptions of peace develop  within the social and historical 
 context, i.e. adolescents do not grow up in a historical, cultural and social 
vacuum.  In their study they chose to compare adolescents in Holland and 
Sweden, two countries that are similar regarding their social 
development.  Both countries belong to Northwest Europe.  Both have a 
democratic regime, and both contain similar social and economic 
standards regarding education, health system social welfare, etc. 
Furthermore, it is important to note that in both countries adolescents are 
educated towards a similar future. There are similar areas of employment, 
 and in both adolescents are fed from information coming from a wealth 
of media.  Despite this fact, a difference was found between adolescents 
of these two countries in perception of the concept of peace, a difference 
that  is apparently  connected to  the nature of their  involvement in World  
War  Two.   While   Holland   was   directly   involved   in  the   war   and  
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experienced the German invasion, Sweden was only indirectly involved 
by equipping the German army and providing information to both sides 
(i.e., neutral).  The research findings indicated a difference in adolescents' 
perception of the concept of peace.  The Dutch adolescents perceived 
peace as negative peace (a lack of war or war activities), more frequently 
than the Swedish adolescents.  The Swedish adolescents tended to relate 
more to positive peace. This tendency was attributed to the two countries' 
different levels of participation in World War Two.
Based on these findings, I expect to find a difference in perceiving peace 
between Israeli Druze adolescents in Druze villages (not mixed) and 
Druze adolescents living in mixed villages (with Moslems and 
Christians), because of the different specific situations that they are in.  
Situation is related to situational factors and impact the concept of peace 
differently. 
Orientations of Narrative - Individualism and Collectivism: Narrative 
includes not only content but also orientation.  Two particularly relevant 
orientations are individual and collective.  These orientations are related 
to analysis of the self as dependent or independent of others surrounding 
him. 
The self category is first and foremost a product of socialization agents, 
such that differences in analysis of the self as independent of others will 
occur in a culture  typified by  individualism. On the other hand, Japanese  
culture tends to see the self as being mutually dependent with those 
surrounding it and an inseparable part of others, and therefore this type of 
culture is a collective culture (Markus & Kitayama, 1991).  An individual  
living  in  an  individualistically  oriented  culture  tends  to see himself as   
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separate from others.  The norm in this type of culture is to highlight each 
individual's uniqueness.  Furthermore, individual behavior stems from 
how one addresses his internal world, his thoughts, his emotions and 
actions and not those of others. In this type of culture, others serve mainly 
for comparison.  On the other hand, in a culture having a collectivist 
orientation, the norm is strengthening mutual dependency between 
individuals.  This type of culture considers the individual to be an 
inseparable part of a system of social relations, and his behavior is highly 
dependent and organized through addressing the thoughts, emotions and 
acts of others who are connected to him through relationships. 
The orientation of Israeli society compared to that of Palestinian society: 
One of the overall changes in Israeli society has been "globalization".  I 
the 1980s this change accelerated.  The significance of this change was 
that Israelis became more aware of and involved in what was occurring in 
 the world much more than in the past.  Globalization has increased 
western influences over Israel and made it, among other things, more 
individualistic and less ideological and cohesive (Samooha, 1999).  This 
is expressed, among other things, in economic privatization in which the 
government is shaking off ownership of assets and in a certain sense its 
responsibility.  A state has been created in which each individual takes 
care of himself.  On the other hand, the Palestinians have gone through 
the opposite process.  Palestinians  lived as individualists in the past. One 
of the harsh  arguments that Arabs made against themselves after the Six 
Day War was that Arabs were individualists to an extreme, and 
individualism  meant  preferring  private  interests  over  the  good  of  the  
group.   An Arab,  although  he  cooperates within his family and friendly  
76
environment, it is difficult for him to deviate from this framework and 
cooperate with everyone in his village, city or homeland (Jubarn Shamia, 
in Harkavi, 1972).  Today, they have a more nationalistic orientation and 
act for a general goal - achieving a state and a national identity as a 
minority is the focus of their group experience (Sliman, 1999). 
The social identity theory may explain the collective nature of the 
Palestinians versus the Jews, because in particular, it addresses situations 
that contain asymmetrical relations between groups, such as majority 
minority relations (Hog & Abrams, 1988).  According to this theory, 
members of the minority group will use a variety of strategies to avoid a 
feeling of low self worth.  One strategy is motivating the group as a 
collective.  Furthermore, in order to achieve their goal, the minority group 
members will participate in a collective struggle.  Therefore, Palestinians, 
who are the  minority in an asymmetrical  relationship with the Jews (Bar, 
Gal & Bar, 1996; Sliman, 1999; Maoz, 2000), will have a more 
collectivist orientation.  In the study by Oyserman (1993) which supports 
the argument that individualist or collectivist orientation is the product of 
culture and social situation, it was found that Arabs have a more 
collectivist orientation than Jews. 
The impact of situational factors over perceptions of the concept of peace:  
Situational factors have a strong impact over how members of a certain 
society understand  concepts related to these situations.  Situations such 
as hunger,  recession  or  mass  catastrophes can create  an immediate  
impact over  the  manner in which  members of a  given  society  perceive  
their social world.  These  influences can be so strong that they leave their  
mark for a long time and become added to social knowledge (Raviv et al., 
1998). 
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Therefore a state of war affects the way members of a given society in 
this state perceive the concepts of peace and war.  This is true of a state of 
violent conflict also. 
Spielmann (1986) indicated in her research that powerful situations that 
awaken hope for peace may also have an impact over the perception of 
war, peace and conflict.  The results of her research showed clearly that 
special situations that are particularly powerful such as the historic visit 
of the President of Egypt, Anwar Sadat to Jerusalem, has an impact on 
how children and adolescents perceive peace.  She performed a 
comparison of how children and adolescents perceived peace before and 
after the visit.  All age groups indicated a change in perceiving the 
concept of peace after the visit.  The younger children changed  their 
positions  from  optimism   to   pessimism,  while  the  older   participants  
changed their attitudes from pessimistic to optimistic. 
The impact of specific educational experiences over perceiving the 
concept of peace: Specific educational experiences that may affect 
perceptions of peace can be curricula on peace, such as workshops on the 
subject, meetings between groups in conflict, specific school activities or 
programs that educate regarding a situation in which there is no peace, 
such as army training activities or summer camps in occupied territories, 
in which youths are taught how to use various weapons. 
The present research will examine the impact of a Civics curriculum 
that includes curricula within the regular school framework and a 
meeting between Jewish Israeli youth and Druze youth. 
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Druze in the Israeli Defense Force 
As previously mentioned, in 1957, the Israeli government recognized the 
Druze sect as an independent religions group and allowed its believers to 
live according to their customs and traditions.  Since the founding of the 
State, the Druze have been serving in the IDF and took part in conquering 
the Galilee, the Sinai operation, the Six Day war, the Yom Kippur War, 
the War Peace of the Galilee and the Second Lebanon War, and all other 
security actions following. 
The Druze unit of the IDF is part of the minority unit.  It was organized 
during the War of Independence by Druze dignitaries who called for all 
young Druze who were bodily able to volunteer to serve in the IDF and to 
take an active part in establishing Israel and maintaining the security of 
its borders and lives of its citizens (Halbi, 1970). 
In 1955, when Arab infiltration to Israel increased, the Druze leaders 
reached the conclusion that Druze youths should be obligated to be 
recruited to the IDF. They turned to David Ben Gurion, the Ministry of 
Defense and asked him to legislate a law of compulsory recruitment 
among the Druze.  Ben Gurion who knew that the Druze were absolutely 
loyal to the state, responded to their request willingly, and the Israeli 
government decided to apply obligatory military service to the Druse.  
Since then, every able bodied male youth is recruited to military service 
at age 18.  The Druze unit soldiers have participated in many battles and 
participate in all security actions and guarding of the country's borders. 
The Minister of Defense, Moshe Dayan said at the gravesite of a Druze 
sergeant who fell chasing terrorists in the South: "These Druze soldiers 
protect   our   lives, and   sometimes   they   are  the   best  and   the  most   
79
daring, they  take greater  risks than  others, break in and attack. Their 
blood spills all over our land".  He added: "The Druze sect is not great in 
numbers, but great in strength.  Its villages and towns sit safely on the 
Carmel and in the Galilee and the best of their youth are on the front, 
spread along the borders, endangering their lives for all residents of 
Israel.  In the mountain paths, in the desert and the South, the brave Druze 
move with their weapons in hand and beat those who try to infiltrate our 
land and kill us". 
Lieutenant General David Elazar said at one of the celebrations of the 
Druze unit: "Eighteen years the Druze unit has existed.  Eighteen years 
the State of Israel has existed. They are the clear signs of cooperation 
between the Druze and the Jewish nation.  Therefore we are partners in 
all, in rights and obligations as one".  He added: "The Druze unit is a 
fighting unit not a representative unit.  It plays its part in continually 
ensuring the security of the state and the peace of the nation.  The 
covenant between the Druze nation and the Jewish nation is not only on 
paper, but it is made holy by the blood of Druze fighters". 
Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin said at the ceremony for a Druze 
memorial: "All those years and all those painful days the Druze sect was 
a partner to the beautiful hours and also the pain of loss.  From the first 
day of the state until this day, the Druze sect has been an inseparable part 
of the security forces.  The Druze, who tied their fate to that of Israel, 
have proved themselves. They have been anywhere they were called, 
fought, did their duty and beyond, their blood has touched ours.  The 
Jewish and Druze shared fate has led to achievements and created 
security.  On this evening I salute the parents, the widows, the orphans 
and all members of this wonderful sect" (Nasaraldin, Halbi, 1993). 
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In conclusion, in the present dissertation I will address the attitudes 
of Druze  youth  regarding  military  service, and  what  the  impact  
of identity and feelings of belonging to the State are.
Attitudes 
The concept of attitude has played an important role throughout the 
development of social psychology for many years.  Allport (1954) 
described the concept of attitude as "the central cornerstone in the 
building of social psychology".  Allport (1935) also defined the concept 
of attitude, and his definition is accepted by most social psychologists to 
this day, although additional various definitions have been offered.  The 
following is Allport's definition:  A person's attitude towards some object 
constitutes a predisposition on his part to respond to the object in a 
consistently favorable or unfavorable manner. 
Generally, as far as attitude is concerned, no differentiation is made 
between the affective and cognitive components of which it is composed, 
since both of these components are connected to one another and are both 
measured verbally.  Often, questions regarding attitudes towards a certain 
object and beliefs related to the object are measured on the same attitude 
scale, and even using the same question (Wicker, 1969).  A possible 
reason for the popularity of the concept of attitude is that social 
psychologists have assumed that attitudes are strongly connected, by 
definition, to social behavior.  In the concluding chapter of his book on 
changing attitudes and social influence Cohen (1964) summarizes that 
most researchers whose work was surveyed in his book, begin with the 
broad   psychological  assumption   that  since  attitudes   are   tendencies  
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towards moral actions, they have an influence on the way people act 
towards one another, on the plans they make for themselves, and the way 
these plans are actually implemented.  This assumption considers an 
attitude to be a sign of behavior and a determinant of the way a person 
will act in his day to day life. 
The concept of behavior in this context relates to overt and measurable 
behavior only.  Furthermore, this is nonverbal behavior that is measurable 
outside of the situation in which the attitude was measured.  Despite the 
fact that this operational definition aims to increase precision in 
measuring behavior and to allow quantifying and analyzing it, as Kendler 
& Kendler (1949) showed, consistency or lack of consistency are actually 
imprecise concepts that are applied by the observer to verbal responses 
and overt actions, i.e., the concept of consistency or inconsistency 
involves the observer's judgment and does not directly address social 
behavior. 
The common assumption mentioned above regarding the close 
connection between attitudes and overt behavior towards the object of the 
attitude led to a series of studies on the subject at the beginning of the 
previous century.  However, as early as 1934 the first study was 
published that contradicted this assumption.  The study, by La Pierre, was 
conducted in the 1930s when much testimony had accumulated as a result 
of studies on social distance, regarding anti-Chinese attitudes in the 
United States. 
La Pierre (1934) crossed the United States with a Chinese couple, and 
without their knowledge, recorded how they were treated in hotels and 
restaurants  that they visited.  Only once throughout the entire journey did 
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 the Chinese couple encounter refusal to be served.  La Pierre found that 
generally service  was  above  average.  Later, he  wrote to 250  hotels 
and restaurants on his list and asked if they would be willing to host a 
Chinese couple, and they all refused, although actually they all had hosted 
the Chinese couple previously when La Pierre was with them. 
Most studies in this field, mainly in the 1950s and 1960s, created a 
general index for attitude towards the stimulus object (Fishbein & Ajzen, 
1974), such as  Negroes, for example.  They studied the relations between 
a grade that a person received on the attitude scale they created and 
between specific behavior towards the object, measured before or after 
measuring the attitude. 
Research on Attitudes of Youths Regarding the Army and Security
Two comprehensive studies were conducted by Levy and Gutman (1974, 
1976).  These studies included questions on the following subjects: The 
value of do and don’t in Israeli society and in school, continuity of the 
Jewish nation in Israel and the Diaspora, relations with Arabs and Arab 
countries, social cohesion, values and perceiving the state regarding 
personal welfare, and factors affecting youths worldview. 
An ongoing study on this topic of youths' attitudes towards the military 
and preferences regarding military service was conducted by the 
Department of Behavioral Sciences of the IDF among youths invited to 
the recruitment center in the years 1974, 1975, 1980 and 1984.  This 
study included a large number of youths from broad cross sections of the 
population (all youths who were candidates for military service), and has 
been  going on  for a number  of years .  The  results of  these  surveys are  
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generally confidential.  These surveys include mainly questions directly 
related to personal military service and less to additional variables, such 
as: values, preparation for the IDF in school, etc.
An additional study conducted on similar subjects was done by Bar-Lev 
(1988) among religious students between the years 1983-1985.  The study 
dealt mainly with desires regarding military service and attitudes 
regarding military service. 
A  more   limited  study  dealing   with  the  issue  of  political and   social 
 Attitudes of  youths   was  commissioned   by  the  Van  Lear  Institute in  
Jerusalem and conducted by the Dahaf Research Institute (1987).  This is 
an ongoing study (similar to studies conducted in 1984 and 1986), 
concerning an examination of youths' attitudes on the following subjects: 
human relations in school and attitudes regarding different social groups. 
Another limited study was conducted by Orr, Liron & Meyer (1986) and 
examined attitudes of youths in 12th grade in different study tracks 
regarding recruitment and service, before and after an intervention 
program. 
A summary of findings in this field was conducted by Zamir (1986), and 
included findings in the field of attitudes of youths, particularly those 
living on the kibbutz, regarding military service.  It offered a theoretical 
framework for understanding changes in attitudes over the years. 
A comprehensive study was conducted by Gal et al. (1989) at the Israeli 
Military/Research Institute.  The study included 5400 male and female 
students in grades 10 through 12 in 85 Jewish schools throughout Israel.  
The schools that were sampled belonged to all sectors (comprehensive 
theoretical,   occupational,  agricultural,  religious,  secular,   urban,  rural,  
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kibbutz). Aside from ultra-Orthodox schools and schools for Israeli 
minorities.  This  study   included   questions  on  various  topics: 
personal attitudes regarding being recruited into the IDF, attitudes 
regarding topics of military and security, sources of influence in these 
areas, and general values. 
The present dissertation will address the attitudes of Druze youth 
regarding the following: volunteering as a value, volunteering for the 
IDF, and the degree of impact of Druze values (beliefs) over this 
value. 
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The Research Hypotheses 
The Background and Rationale Behind the Hypotheses
The question of identity in the State of Israel is one of the most complex 
questions in the current era (Shafir, 2002).  Israel has existed for sixty 
years in the Middle East, whereas for more than a thousand years it was 
under the rule of the Ottomans, who took the place of the Byzantine 
Empire.  The leaders of the Ottoman Empire were Turkish, not Arabs, but 
from a religions standpoint, they were Moslem.  The establishment of a 
Jewish State within a territory controlled by a Moslem empire, perceived  
by the Arab world as being an Arab entity, created a deep state of 
problematics regarding the issue of rights and obligations towards the 
new State, the status of Arab residents living in the state from before the 
time of Statehood, and also raised the issue of ownership of area.  Within 
this complex system lies the Druze sect. 
Historically, the Druze developed relations with the Jewish nation before 
the creation of the State and were partners in creating the Jewish State 
(Atasha, 1995).  On the other hand, the Druze, by their own perceptions, 
feel that they have been more complexly aligned with the Arab group 
throughout history.  On one hand, the Druze belong socially and 
linguistically to the Arab grouping, but are not Moslems.  On the other 
hand, they separated from Islam in the 11th century.  As seen in the 
existing Druze literature, Islam has not tolerated religions deviating from 
its doctrines (Falah, 2000). 
Furthermore, Islam considers the Druze to belong to it, because in the 
past they believed in the principles of Islam, and generally operated based 
on  the concept of   "Hatkiya",  throughout  their  past, along  with  Islam,  
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living under the patronage of Moslems, and therefore Islam does not 
accept it as being a separate sect.  An example of this is the lifestyle of 
the Druze in Jordan and Syria.  The Druze of Jordan live under the 
patronage of the Moslems.  They are not given a separate position, and 
their religious voice is overcome in any attempt to prove that they are in 
fact separate or different.  They are overpowered by the Arab Moslem 
voice.  On the other hand, the Druze in Syria do not highlight the 
religious element in perceiving themselves, and emphasize their loyalty to 
the State and its ruler.  This tension with the Arab group continues to 
stand out in the lives of Druze in Israel, but has become stronger based on 
the political situation in which Israel finds itself facing the Arabs, and in 
light of the fact that the members of the Druze sect serve in the military. 
Today, the lifestyle of the Druze in Israel and worldwide, hints at two 
main axes in their perceptions of themselves and their position in both the 
specific and the public arena.  On one hand, the Druze in Israel feel like 
Israelis in every way.  They feel belonging to the State of Israel and 
perceive Israel as their homeland.  They are involved in all areas of life, 
are connected with a modern lifestyle, and adopt this into their personal 
lives, drawing on the principles of democracy in the Israeli regime by 
expressing their opinions, standing out as a separate group, demanding 
their rights from the State as equal citizens, etc.  On the other hand, 
linguistically, and culturally, they belong to the Arab world. 
The Social Contact Hypothesis
This is a theoretical approach which assumes that contact between people 
leads  to change in  beliefs and emotions of an  individual  towards others. 
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Social psychologists since the 1930s have  felt that social contract has led 
to changes in prejudice, and to closeness between various groups (Baker, 
1934; Tajfel, 1978; Allport, 1954; Watson, 1947). 
The term "prejudice", means an attitude attributing to another patterns of 
behavior or attributes based on what group he belongs to, ignoring 
personal skills, and only using an erroneous form of generalization 
expressing a negative attitude towards an entire social group or members 
of the social group (Allport, 1954). 
St. John (1975) posits that a prejudice contains three components 
expressed in ethnic contact: 
1. The cognitive component - including beliefs regarding ethnic 
differences or an ideology regarding the nature of relations 
between ethnic groups. 
2. The emotional component - expressing positive or negative 
emotions towards an ethnic group or contact between groups. 
3. The behavioral component - expressed in willingness to act in 
certain ways towards a certain group or toward individuals who 
are members in the group. 
Theoretical explanations are offered regarding the psychological 
processes leading to changes in interpersonal relations at the time of a 
meeting.  
A meeting is presented as a renewing educational situation (Rose, 1947) 
assuming that during the encounter, opportunities are created for mutual 
familiarity between majority group members and minority group 
members.  This familiarity provides participants with information that 
contradicts their prejudice and disproves it through relearning which leads 
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to acquisition of more realistic and positive beliefs.  Therefore the 
research hypothesis will be formulated as follows: 
First hypothesis - There is a difference between the perceptions of Druze 
students learning in Druze schools and those learning in mixed schools 
regarding the Israeli-Arab conflict and the peace process, based on 
differences in degree of Druze students' exposure to the Arab population. 
Second Hypothesis - Attitudes of Druze students learning in Druze 
schools will be more positive than students learning in mixed schools 
regarding identification with the State and motivation to volunteer and 
contribute to the State. 
The Impact of Druse Tradition and  Faith Hypothesis
The introduction mentions the principles of Druze belief, reincarnation, 
fate, etc., which are common both within the sect and outside of it. These 
are among the factors that encourage Druze youths to volunteer and 
contribute despite risk to their lives, stemming from their belief in fate 
and reincarnation, two central values of Druze belief. 
Third Hypothesis - This hypothesis examines if there is a correlation 
between living based on the principles of Druze faith and between 
volunteering and contributing to the State, even at risk to one's life. 
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The Research 
1. The Research Design 
The research was conducted among 100 youths, all students in 12th 
grade, in two comprehensive Druze schools in a  Druze village and a 
mixed Druze village in the north of Israel. 
This may not be considered a representative sample of Druze youths of  
this age group throughout the country as these two schools were not 
chosen randomly but rather for random reasons.  These two schools are 
defined as Druze schools, because in one school all of the students are 
Druze and in the other, most of the students are Druze. 
The distribution of the students is as follows: 
Table 1: Distribution of Respondents by Type of School
Type of School Total Respondents Percentage 
Druze 50  50% 
Mixed 50  50% 
The research population was composed of boys and girls as follows: 
Table 2: Distribution of Respondents by Gender
Gender Total Respondents Percentage 
Boys 50  50% 
Girls 50  50% 
The research population was composed of religious and secular youths as 
follows: 
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Table 3: Distribution of Respondents by Religiosity
Religiosity Total Respondents Percentage 
Secular 80  80% 
Religious 20  20% 
Furthermore, parents' level of education was examined.  In our analysis 
only the distribution of fathers' education was used. 
Table 4: Distribution of Respondents by Father's Education
Father's Education Total Respondents Percentage 
Up to 8 years 29  29% 
9-12 years 25  25% 
13+ years 46  46% 
The research data were gathered on questionnaires distributed in the 
classes at the end of the 2007 school year.  The questionnaires were 
structured questionnaires with closed ended questions. 
The first section of the research is an analysis of the questionnaire by 
presenting averages.  The second part of the research is an examination of 
correlations between the variables. 
2. The Research Method 
The research was conducted among 100 youths, all Druze students in 
12th grade in two Druze high schools in Israel:  50 Druze girls and 50 
Druze boys. 
The following is the distribution of students according to the two schools: 
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Table 5: Distribution of Students by Village
School School Type Respondents Percentages 
Beit Jan Druze 50  50% 
Majar Mixed 50 50% 
The respondents were divided by areas of residence:
Upper Galilee- Beit Jan, a solely Druze village 
Lower Galilee: Majar - a mixed village of Druze, Moslems and 
Christians. 
Table 6: Distribution of Students by Gender and Village
Area of Residence Boys Girls 
Beit Jan 25 25 
Majar 25 25 
Total 50 50 
3. The Questionnaire Topics 
The questionnaire included three main areas of content, in addition to 
background data. 
a) Attitudes regarding the Israeli Arab conflict and the peace process: 
• The chances for peace and war. 
• The desire for peace among the participants in the conflict.                 
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• Willingness for compromise and perceiving the peace 
process. 
• Terror and the peace process. 
• Results of the peace process. 
• Sources of influence over attitudes regarding the 
conflict and the peace process. 
b) Values, national identity and perception of democracy: 
• Personal values. 
• National identity and connection to Israel. 
• Attitudes regarding democratic values. 
c) Attitudes regarding being recruited and serving in the army or in 
national service. 
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The Research Findings 
Presentation of the Data 
1) The research results are divided into three areas of content: 
1. Attitudes towards the Israeli-Arab conflict and the peace process.                 
2. Attitudes towards military service and contribution to the State.         
3. Democratic and Druze values and Druze identity. 
2) In each area of content, for each question that is presented, the data 
were analyzed in general for all respondents, and then according to 
groups.  Examination of differences between sub-groups was conducted 
using T tests and variance analysis. Examinations of correlations between 
the motivation variables and identity variables were conducted using 
correlations. 
1. Relative frequencies and averages of various items 
comprising the topic of the area.  These findings will be 
presented by school, and in relevant cases, will be presented 
according to gender also. 
2. Some of the issues included a number of indices (index - 
average of a number of items measuring the same world of 
content).  For each index the following were calculated:  
Averages by type of school; average by socio-demographic 
variables; and correlations with content variables within the 
research, correlations between various indices in the same 
area of content. 
3. Summary of each issue and each area as a whole. 
4. The results are presented in two parts 
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The first part describes the data which are of interest within the 
framework of the present research. 
The second part presents the findings related to the hypotheses. 
The following table presents the main attitude scales, with additional 
details regarding the questions which comprise the indices delineated 
further on in the dissertation. 
The Research Indices by World of Content
Area Attitude   Item number   
The Israeli-Arab 
Conflict and the Peace 
Process 
1. Willingness for concessions 
2. Druze desire for peace 
3. Positive results of the peace     
    agreement 
4. Positive results for Arabs 
5. Terror as part of life and fear of it. 
6. Sources of impact over attitudes in   
    the field of: 
- Teachers and school 
- Atmosphere and 
media. 
- Significant figures 
5 
2 






General Values and 
Perception of 
Democracy 
1. Materialism and Liberalism 
2. Contributing to the group 
3. Religiosity and family 
4. Academic achievement 
5. Progress and mobility 
6. Identity and connection to the  
    country 








Military Service 1. Motivation for significant service.  
Druze Values and 
Identity 
1. National identity 





The items for each area were analyzed for relative frequency, average and 
standard deviation.  Examinations of differences between sub-populations 
(Druze students in Druze schools and Druze students in mixed schools) 
were conducted using T tests.  Correlations between variables were 
examined using coefficients. 
The First Hypothesis 
The first research hypothesis is that there is a difference between the 
perceptions of Druze students learning in Druze schools and those 
learning in mixed schools regarding the Israeli-Arab conflict, and the 
peace process. 
Attitudes Towards the Israeli-Arab Conflict and the Peace Process
Chance for Peace and War 
Belief regarding the ability of achieving peace is an important factor 
behind finding a resolution to the Israeli-Arab conflict. 
The following table presents data by gender to the question:  Can peace 
be achieved? (This question had four possible answers from "Absolutely 
yes", to "Absolutely not") 
Table 7: Belief that Peace may be Achieved
(Percent answering "yes" or "absolutely yes") 
 Boys Girls 
Peace can be achieved 74% 68% 
The table indicates that between 2/3 and 3/4 of the participants in the 
study believe that peace can be achieved. 
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We now examine attitudes according to type of school.  The question had 
four possible answers.  Higher numbers express a stronger belief that 
peace can be achieved. 
Table 8: Can Peace by Achieved (by Type of School)
Druze School 2.35 
Mixed School 2.90 
The table indicates the following findings: 
1. Each of the schools report that peace can be achieved. 
2. However, the mixed school has a strong belief that peace can 
be achieved. 
3. In order to illustrate the difference, we may present the data 
in percentages, i.e., in the mixed school 78% believe that 
peace can be achieved, versus the Druze school where only 
65% hold this belief. 
In addition, the students were asked if they feel that there will be another 
war between Israel and Arab countries in the coming years. 
The following table presents the distribution of those responding "There 
will not be another war" or "There may be another war within 10 years". 
Table 9: No War is Expected By School Type
 Druze  Mixed 
No war expected 27% 46% 
The table indicates that a quarter of the Druze students in Druze schools 
perceive a low probability of an additional war.  On the other hand, half 
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of the Druze students learning in a mixed school feel that no war is 
expected in the near future. 
The students in the Druze school are more skeptical regarding the present 
peace process as ending future wars, relative to the students in the mixed 
school. 
We examined belief in peace using an indirect question:  "Do you agree  
that in order to exist as a State, Israel has no choice but to maintain a 
strong army and to fight for its existence?".  A positive response to this 
question is related to the belief that peace can be achieved.  80% of the 
Druze students learning in the Druze school reported strongly agreeing or 
agreeing that Israel must maintain a strong army today.  On the other 
hand, 69% of the Druze students in the mixed school agreed with this 
statement. 
Summary of the Topic of the Chance for Peace and War
Approximately 2/3 of the Druze students learning in a Druze school 
believe that peace can be achieved, and 1/4 assess that there is a low 
probability for a war in the future. 
In the mixed school, the Druze students report a higher belief that peace 
can be achieved.  3/4 of the students believe that peace can be achieved 
and 1/2 assess a low probability for war in the future. 
The belief that peace can be achieved is related to the perception that a 
peace agreement will lead to positive results.  Most of the Druze students 
studying in either Druze and/or mixed schools believe that in order to 
maintain a state, a strong army is necessary. 
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The Desire for Peace 
In order to achieve peace, it is very important to want to achieve it. 
Furthermore, it is also important to examine how each side perceives the 
desire for peace of the other side. 
The following table presents the data from the responses to the question: 
To what degree do you think most Jews in Israel/ Druze in Israel/ Arabs 
in Israel, are interested in peace? 
No significant differences were found in responses by gender, and 
therefore only differences between type of school will be presented. 
(There were four possible responses to the question:  Very much, to a 
degree, little, not at all). 
Table 10: The Desire for Peace, by Type of School
(Percent answering "very much") 
Question Druze Mixed 
Most Jews in Israel are interested in peace 77% 65%
Most Druze in Israel are interested in peace 71% 76% 
Most Arabs in Israel are interested in peace 79% 83% 
Palestinians and Arab States are interested in 
peace 
59% 77% 
The table indicates the following findings: 
1. Druze students studying in the Druze school perceive the 
Israeli Arabs and Jews as most interested in peace, and the 
Palestinians and Arab States as less interested in peace. 
2. The Druze students in the mixed school perceive Israeli 
Arabs and Palestinians and Arab States as more interested in 
peace, and the Jews as less interested in peace. 
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Illustration 1: Rights to Territories According to Type of School (Percent)
The IDF's Deterrent Ability 
The deterrent ability of the IDF is seemingly important as a catalyst for 
the desire for peace on the other side.  The following table presents the 
percentage of those who responded that the IDF's deterrent ability is high 
or very high, and also provides the average for the question (high 
numbers indicate high deterrent ability).  The results are first presented 
according to gender. 
Table 11: IDF's Deterrent Ability by Gender
(Percent answering "high" or "very high") 
 Boys Girls 
Percent 72% 68% 
Average 3.85 3.76 
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The Druze students perceive the IDF as having a high deterrent ability.  
The boys feel that this is stronger than the girls do. 
The Peace Process - Willingness for Concessions and Perception of the 
Process 
An important component of the Israeli-Arab conflict is the perception of 
who has more right to territories in Israel. 
The following table presents the findings regarding the question:  Who 
has more rights over Judea and Samaria?  The responses are provided 
according to school (there were three possible responses, and a low 
number indicates that Jews have more right, a high number indicates that 
Arabs have more right, and the middle number indicates that both have 
equal rights). 
Table 12: Who has More Right to Territories, by Type of School
 Druze Mixed 
Jews have more right 31% 19% 
Jews and Arabs have equal rights 28% 25% 
Arabs have more right 41% 56% 
The table indicates the following conclusions: 
The Druze students attribute more rights to Judea and Samaria to Arabs 
than to Jews.  The territories are one major issue of the conflict.  We 
examined if, according to the respondents, Israel must return or not return 
the Golan Heights, Judea and Samaria within the framework of or in 
return for a peace agreement. 
The  following are  the  findings.  In general,  no differences  were  found  
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between  boys and  girls,  and  therefore  the  findings  are only  presented  
based on type of school. 
Table 13: Willingness to Concede Land
 Golan Heights Judea and Samaria 
 All Some None All  Some None 
Druze School 51% 29% 20% 59% 31% 10% 
Mixed School 58% 24% 18% 70% 25% 6% 
The results of the table indicate the following conclusions: 
Among Druze students there is the least willingness for concessions in 
the Golan Heights compared to Judea and Samaria. 
Now, we examine these issues by school type.  First we examine the 
findings regarding willingness to concede land for a peace agreement 
(answers ranging from 1-3 with higher numbers expressing less 
willingness for land concessions). 
Table 14: Unwillingness to Concede Territory, by Type of School
 Druze Mixed 
Return Golan Heights for peace 2.00 1.90 
Return Judea and Samaria for peace 1.50 1.36 
The table indicates the following findings: 
• In the Druse school, the students show more "right"   
     wing attitudes than students in the mixed Druze school. 
• The Druze students in both types of school show less  
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willingness to concede the Golan Heights than Judea and 
Samaria. 
We examined the correlation between willingness for concessions in the 
peace process and between socio-demographic background variables.  
The following findings arose: 
1. Parental education: the higher the educational level of 
the mother and father, the more willingness there was 
for concessions (correlation of -0.18) 
2. Economic status: a lower economic situation was 
correlated with a higher level of lack of willingness 
for concessions (correlation of 0.15) 
In summary of the topic of willingness for concessions and perception of 
the peace process: 
• The Druze students perceive that Arabs have 
more right to Judea and Samaria than the Jews. 
• A relatively high rate of Druze students feels that 
Israel should return all of the territories (Golan 
heights 54%, Judea and Samaria 65%). 
• There is no great difference between the 
perceptions of Druze students in the Druze 
school and those in the mixed school. 
• The Druze students in the Druze school show 
more right wing attitudes than the Druze students 
in a mixed school. 
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Results of the Peace Process 
This section examines how the students perceive the chances for various 
results of the peace process.  The results of the process and the chances 
for their realization are very important as they are related to belief in the 
possibility for peace and the desire to achieve peace. 
The following table presents the chances for results of the peace process.  
The scale included five categories, with high numbers expressing high 
chances.  The results are presented as averages and arranged in 
descending order for all of the Druze students. (The results are rated in 
parentheses from highest -1 to lowest -12). 
Table 15: Results of the Peace Process
Average Rating 
Economic growth 3.66 (1) 
Sense of personal security 3.13 (2) 
End of the wars  3.27 (3) 
Cooperation between nations 3.21 (4) 
Creation of a Palestinian State 2.41 (5) 
Increased terror against Israel  2.92 (6) 
Removal of Jewish settlements in the territories 2.85 (7) 
Friendship between Jews and Palestinians 2.67 (8) 
Conceding land for no peace 2.59 (9) 
Realizing the right of return 2.39 (10) 
Autonomy of Israeli Arabs 2.35 (11) 
Conceding sovereignty over East Jerusalem 2.00 (12)
The table indicates the following findings: 
Among  the  Druze  students,  the results perceived as most likely (first 4)  
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are those which are of interest to all sides involved in the peace process, 
Jews and Arabs (economic growth, personal security, cooperation, end of  
wars).  On the other hand, the  Druze  students evaluate that there is a low  
chance for conceding sovereignty over Jerusalem and realizing the right 
of return, which are points of contention between the Jews and Arabs in 
their negotiations. 
Perception of this situation is quite pessimistic regarding the peace 
process, and may decrease the belief that peace can be achieved.  Among 
the Druze students, the worrisome issues are that the aims of the peace 
process are perceived as unlikely to occur.  We now move on to examine 
the data based on type of school, relating to the results which are 
controversial. 
Table 16: Results of the Peace Process - by Type of School
Item Druze Mixed 
Removal of settlements  3.58 3.73 
Autonomy for Israeli Arabs 3.45 3.81 
Palestinian State 3.25 3.48 
Conceding land for no peace 3.24 3.75 
Right of return 2.66 3.16 
Conceding sovereignty of East Jerusalem 2.24 2.37 
The following findings arise from the table: 
The results that Arabs have an interest in are perceived by the Druze 
students in a mixed school to have a greater chance to be realized. 
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In summary of the issue of the results of the peace process: 
Among the Druze students, the positive results which are common to all 
sides of the conflict were perceived to have a high probability for 
realization   as  a  result  of   the   peace   process .  The  results   that   are  
Worrisome  and under  dispute  are  perceived  to have a lower chance for  
realization based on the peace process.  In general, compared to the 
students in the Druze school, the students in the mixed school perceive a 
better probability of realizing results which are of an interest to Arabs. 
Factors Affecting the Attitudes of the Druze Students 
The factors affecting the attitudes of the Druze students regarding the 
Israeli-Arab conflict and the peace process were examined.  The students 
were asked to mark, for various factors, to what degree each one of them 
affects their attitudes on the subject.  The following is a list of factors, in 
descending order, from the highest (most influential) factor to the lowest 
(least influential) factor. 
Table 17: Factors Affecting Attitudes on the Israeli-Arab Conflict and the 
Peace Process
Item Average Rating 
Atmosphere in Israel 3.95 1 
The media 3.93 2 
Parents 2.96 3 
Friends/Peers 2.72 4 
Teachers at school 2.60 5 
Religious figures 2.58 6 
General school activities 2.50 7 
Youth movement counselors 2.45 8 
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The table indicates that "the atmosphere in Israel" and "the media" are 
perceived as having a high degree of impact over students' attitudes 
regarding  the Israeli-Arab  conflict .  These are  the main  source of up to  
date information on the issue of the peace process.  The media and the 
general atmosphere in Israel are generally an expression of the general 
social norms in Israel. 
The significant role of general non-specific environmental systems, such 
as atmosphere and media, is clearly evident in its impact over the 
attitudes of students regarding the Israeli-Arab conflict and the peace 
process. 
On the  other hand, the impact of more formal factors, such as teachers 
and youth movement counselors are perceived as lower regarding these 
subjects.  At the same time, it is clear that friends and peer group 
apparently serve as role models and a source of identification and as a 
main source of up to date information on the subject. 
It is interesting that 21% of the students feel that teachers in school do not 
have any impact at all over their attitudes, versus 22% who feel that 
teachers have a strong and very strong impact.  26% of the students feel 
that school has no impact on their attitudes at all, while 21% feel that 
school has a strong to very strong impact over them. 
Examination of the First Hypothesis
The first research hypothesis is that there is a difference between the 
perceptions of Druze students learning in Druze schools and those 
learning in mixed schools regarding the Israeli-Arab conflict and the 
peace process.  
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In order to examine this hypothesis, we compared between two schools, a 
Druze school and a mixed school, regarding the items related to the issue 
of the Israeli-Arab conflict and the peace process.  Distribution of the 
respondents  was  50  respondents  from the Druze  school  (50%)  and 50 
 respondents from the mixed school (50%). 
In order to compare the two groups, T tests were conducted to examine 
differences in averages of respondents from the Druze school and 
respondents from the mixed school in attitudes regarding the peace 
process and the conflict. 
General Attitudes Regarding the Israeli-Arab Conflict and the Peace 
Process 
Questions related to peace
* To what degree do you feel most of the Jewish population in Israel is 
interested in peace? 
1. Not at all; 2: Little; 3. To a degree; 4. Very much
Table 18: Distribution of Students' Responses to "Most of the Jewish 
Population is Interested in Peace"
Item Average S.D. N 1 2 3 4 
Druze 3.12 0.84 50 4 19 40 37 
Mixed 2.83 0.85 50 6 29 42 23 
P<0.05; t=1.72 
A significant difference was found between perceptions of Druze students 
in the Druze school and the mixed school regarding their perception of 
Jews in Israel being interested in peace. 
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When combining "To a degree" and "Very much", it as found that the 
students in the Druze school responded more highly to this topic (77%) 
compared to the students in the mixed school (65%).  Statistically, this 
difference is significant (p<0.05). 
* To what degree are Arab citizens of Israel interested in peace? 
1. Not at all; 2: Little; 3. To a degree; 4. Very much 
Table 19: Distribution of Students' Responses to "Israeli Arabs are 
Interested in Peace"
Item Average S.D. N 1 2 3 4 
Druze 3.18 0.86 50 4 16 36 43 
Mixed 3.27 0.83 50 3 14 35 48 
P<0.05; t=0.53 
When combining the categories of "to a degree" and "very much", a 
difference was found between the students in the Druze school (79%) and 
the mixed school (83%), although this difference is not statistically 
significant. 
* To what degree do you feel most of the Druze in Israel are interested in 
peace? 
1. Not at all; 2: Little; 3. To a degree; 4. Very much 
Table 20: Distribution of Students' Responses to "Most Druze in Israel 
are Interested in Peace"
Item Average S.D. N 1 2 3 4 
Druze 2.89 0.84 50 6 23 47 24 
Mixed 3.06 0.82 50 3 21 42 34 
P<0.05; t=1.02 
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When combining the two categories of "to a degree" and "very much", a 
difference was found between the students in the Druze school (71%) and 
the mixed school (76%), although this difference is not statistically 
significant. 
* To what degree do you feel most of the Arabs (Palestinians and 
neighboring countries) are interested in peace? 
1. Not at all; 2: Little; 3. To a degree; 4. Very much 
Table 21: Distribution of Students' Responses to "Palestinians and Arab 
States are Interested in Peace"
Item Average S.D. N 1 2 3 4 
Druze 2.97 0.83 50 3 28 29 30 
Mixed 3.27 0.96 50 7 16 21 56 
P<0.05; t=1.67 
A significant difference was found between the perceptions of the 
students in the Druze school and those in the mixed school regarding to 
what degree Palestinians and Arab states are interested in peace.  When 
combining the categories of "to a degree" and "very much", the students 
in the mixed school responded more highly (77%) than the students in the 
Druze school (59%).  This difference is statistically significant (p<0.05). 
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Druse School Mixed School
* Do you feel it is possible or impossible to achieve peace between Israel 
and the Arabs? 
1. Not at all; 2: No; 3. Yes; 4. Absolutely 
Table 22: Distribution of Students' Responses to "Peace between the 
Israel and the Arabs"
Item Average S.D. N 1 2 3 4 
Druze 2.64 0.88 50 12 28 45 15 
Mixed 2.94 0.85 50 7 19 48 26 
P<0.05; t=1.73 
A significant difference was found between the perceptions of the 
students in the Druze school and those in the mixed school regarding to 
what degree it was possible to achieve peace between Israel and the 
Arabs.  When connecting the two categories "Yes" and "Absolutely", it 
was found that students in the mixed school responded more highly to 
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this question (74%) compared to students in the Druze school (60%).  
This difference was found to be statistically significant (p<0.05). 
* Who has more rights to Judea and Samaria, the Jews or the Arabs? 
1. The Arabs have much more rights; 2. The Arabs have more rights;  
3. Both have equal rights; 4. The Jews have more right;  5. the Jews have 
much more right. 
Table 23: Distribution of Students' Responses to "Rights to the Territories 
of Judea and Samaria, Jews or Arabs"
Item Average S.D. N 1 2 3 4 5 
Druze 2.87 1.33 50 19 22 28 15 16 
Mixed 2.43 1.18 50 24 32 27 9 8 
P<0.05; t=1.74 
A significant difference was found between the perceptions of the 
students in the Druze school and those in the mixed school.  When 
connecting two categories (4,5) indicating more rights to Jews regarding 
the territories, it was found that students in the Druze school responded 
more highly to this question (31%) compared to students in the mixed 
school (17%).  On the other hand, when connecting the two categories 
(1,2) indicating more rights for Arabs to the territories, it was found that 
students in the mixed school responded more highly (56%), compared to 
students in the Druze school (41%).   This difference was found to be 
statistically significant (p<0.05). 
*Within the framework of a peace agreement with the Palestinians, do 
you feel that Israel should or should not return Judea and Samaria? 
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1. Israel should return all of Judea and Samaria; 2. Israel should return 
only part of Judea and Samaria; 3. Israel should not return any of Judea 
and Samaria. 
Table 24: Distribution of Students' Responses to "Returning Territories in 
Judean And Samaria in  Peace Agreement"
Item Average S.D. N 1 2 3 
Druze 1.50 0.66 50 59 31 9 
Mixed 1.36 0.59 50 70 25 6 
P<0.05; t=1.21 
59% of the students in the Druze school feel that within the framework of 
a peace agreement, Israel should return Judea and Samaria.  On the other 
hand, 70% of the students in the mixed school feel this way.  However, 
this difference is not statistically significant. 
* Do you feel Israel should or should not agree to the creation of a 
Palestinian State? 
1. Absolutely should agree; 2: I think they should agree; 3. I think they 
should not agree; 4. Absolutely should not agree. 
Table 25: Distribution of Students' Responses to "Creating a Palestinian 
State"
Item Average S.D. N 1 2 3 4 
Druze 2.65 0.87 50 7 41 32 20 
Mixed 2.17 0.82 50 19 51 22 7 
P<0.05; t=2.83 
A significant difference was found between the perceptions of the 
students in the Druze school and those in the mixed school.  When 
connecting  the  two  categories  (1,2) indicating  agreement to  creating a  
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Palestinian State, the students in the mixed school responded more highly 
to this question (70%) than the students in the Druze school (48%).  This 
difference was found to be statistically significant (p<0.05). 
The Peace Process 
* What are the chances that the present peace process will lead to and end 
to wars in the next few years? 
1. Very low chance; 2. Low chance; 3. Medium chance. 4. High chance;    
5. Very high chance 
Table 26: Distribution of Students' Responses to "Peace Process will 
Lead to and End to Wars"
Item Average S.D. N 1 2 3 4 5 
Druze 3.07 1.08 50 11 15 38 28 8 
Mixed 3.46 1.02 50 3 13 41 24 20 
P<0.05; t=1.85 
Combining the two categories (4,5) indicating a high chance for the peace 
process to lead to the end of wars, shows that 44% of the students in the 
mixed school feel that the peace process will end wars, versus 36% of the 
students in the Druze school.  This difference was found to be statistically 
significant (p<0.05). 
* What are the chances that the present peace process will lead to 
cooperation between the nations within a few years?
1. Very low chance; 2. Low chance; 3. Medium chance. 4. High chance;    
5. Very high chance 
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Table 27: Distribution of Students' Responses to "Peace Process will 
Lead to Cooperation between Nations"
Item Average S.D. N 1 2 3 4 5 
Druze 3.19 1.16 50 8 21 29 27 14 
Mixed 3.23 1.21 50 9 18 30 24 18 
P<0.05; t=0.17 
Combining the two categories (4.5) indicating a high chance for the peace 
process to lead to cooperation between nations, shows that 42% of the 
students in the mixed school feel that the peace process will do so, versus 
41% of the students in the Druze school.  This difference was not 
statistically significant. 
* What are the chances that the present peace process will lead to a 
feeling of personal security within a few years? 
1. Very low chance; 2. Low chance; 3. Medium chance. 4. High chance;    
5. Very high chance 
Table 28: Distribution of Students' Responses to "Peace Process will 
Lead to Personal Security"
Item Average S.D. N 1 2 3 4 5 
Druze 2.92 1.2 50 15 18 39 16 12 
Mixed 3.33 1.22 50 9 15 30 25 21 
P<0.05; t=1.69 
A significant difference was found between the perceptions of the 
students in the Druze school and those in the mixed school regarding the 
attitude that the peace process will lead to a feeling of personal security.  
When  connecting   the  two  categories  "high chance",   and  "very high  
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chance" the students in the mixed school responded more highly to the 
question (46%), than the students from the Druze school (28%).  This was 
a statistically significant difference (p<0.05). 
* What are the chances that the present peace process will lead to an 
increase in terror within a few years? 
1. Very low chance; 2. Low chance; 3. Medium chance. 4. High chance;    
5. Very high chance 
Table 29: Distribution of Students' Responses to "Peace Process will 
Lead to Increased Terror"
Item Average S.D. N 1 2 3 4 5 
Druze 3.13 1.24 50 13 17 31 24 15 
Mixed 2.70 1.28 50 22 23 29 14 12 
P<0.05; t=1.70 
A significant difference was found between the perceptions of the 
students in the Druze school and those in the mixed school regarding the 
attitude that the peace process will lead to an increase in terror.  When 
connecting the two categories "high chance" and "very high chance", the 
students in the Druze school responded more positively to this question 
(39%), compared with the students in the mixed school (26%).  This is a 
statistically significant difference (p<0.05). 
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Table 30: Comparing Averages and T Values for Druze Students' 
Perceptions (Druze School, Mixed School) Regarding Peace
 Type of School 
Peace Druze Mixed T val. Scale 
Jews are interested in peace 3.12 2.83 1.72* 4 
Israeli Arabs are interested in peace 3.18 3.27 0.53NS 4 
Druze in Israel are interested in peace 2.89 3.06 1.02NS 4 
Palestinians are interested in peace 2.97 3.27 1.67* 4 
Peace between Israel and Arabs 2.64 2.94 1.73* 4 
Right to Judea and Samaria 2.87 2.43 1.74* 5 
Peace agreement and conceding land 1.50 1.36 1.21NS 3 
Creating Palestinian State 2.65 2.17 2.83* 4 
Peace Process     
Process will end war 3.07 3.46 1.85* 5 
Process will lead to cooperation 3.19 3.23 0.17NS 5 
Process will lead to personal security 2.92 3.33 1.69* 5 
Process will lead to increased terror 3.13 2.70 1.70* 5 
*Significant to 0.05 at least. 
Summary of the First Hypothesis
We found that there is a difference between the perceptions of students 
studying in the Druze school compared to those of students in the mixed 
school regarding the Israeli-Arab conflict and the peace process.  
Sometimes the difference is not statistically significant, as seen in Table 
30. 
These findings support the first research hypothesis that there is a 
difference between the perceptions of Druze students learning in Druze 
schools and those learning in mixed schools regarding the Israeli-Arab 
conflict and the peace process. 
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Attitudes Regarding Military Recruitment and Service 
This section addresses the following issues: 
The desire to be recruited and fears about service.
Motivation to serve in a front line position and in voluntary units. 
The desire to be an officer or to become a career officer. 
School as encouraging service in front line units. 
The Second Hypothesis
This hypothesis is based on the theory of social contact as mentioned in 
the theoretical chapter, which posits that contact between individuals 
leads to a change in attitudes of individuals towards one another.  
Therefore the hypothesis is as follows: Exposure of Druze students to an 
Arab population that does not serve in the army will affect their level of 
identification with the State and their motivation to volunteer and 
contribute to the State. 
Recruitment and Serving in the Military 
Desire to be recruited and fears regarding service
In the research, we asked the students how much they want or do not 
want to be recruited to the IDF, when the time comes.  The tables below 
present the data (four category scale from "very much want" to "do not 
want at all").  The data relate to the percentage of those who responded 
"very much want" and "want" to be recruited to the military, and to the 
averages for the question (high numbers indicate more desire to serve). 
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Table 31: Desire to be Recruited, by Type of School
 Druze  Mixed 
Very much want/want 
to be recruited 
73% 53% 
Average 3.11 2.70 
Table 32: Desire to be Recruited, by Type of School
Item Average S.D. N 1 2 3 4 
Druze 3.11 0.92 50 5 22 30 43 
Mixed 2.70 1.12 50 18 28 19 34 
P<0.05; t=2.00 
A significant difference was found between attitudes of students in the 
Druze school and attitudes of students in the mixed school regarding the 
desire to be recruited into the IDF. 
We examined the motivation to be recruited with an additional question:  
If IDF service was voluntary, what would you do/  The question included 
four possible responses:  volunteering for 3 years, two years, one year or 
not at all. 
The table below presents the data (in percents) for this question.  
Furthermore, the average response to the question is also presented 
(higher numbers express a higher desire to volunteer) 
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Table 33: What Would you do if Service was Voluntary, by Type of 
School
 Druze  Mixed 
Volunteer 3 years 52% 35% 
Volunteer 2 years 22% 26% 
Volunteer one year 17% 23% 
Not volunteer 9% 17% 
Average  3.17 2.78 
Table 34: Distribution of Students' Responses Regarding Volunteer 
Service
Item Average S.D. N 1 2 3 4 
Druze 3.17 1.01 50 9 17 22 52 
Mixed 2.78 1.10 50 17 23 26 35 
P<0.05; t=1.98 
A significant difference was found between attitudes of students in the 
Druze school and attitudes of students in the mixed school regarding 
volunteering for military service.  A high rate of students learning in the 
Druze school report that they would perform full military service even if 
it was voluntary. Another aspect related to the desire to be recruited is the 
level of concern regarding service which is typical of people before 
entering the army. 
The following table presents the percentage of those who report that they 
are "highly concerned" or "concerned" (on a five category scale). 
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Table 35: Distribution of Students' Responses Regarding Concern for 
Military Service
Item Average S.D. N 1 2 3 4 
Druze 1.95 0.99 50 39 39 11 10 
Mixed 2.10 0.91 50 25 50 16 7 
P<0.05; t=0.49 
No significant differences were found between the students in the Druze 
and mixed schools as to concerns regarding military service. 
Motivation to Serve in Front Line Positions in Volunteer Units 
The students were asked two questions on this issue: 
1) "To what degree do you want to serve in a front line unit/position?"  
There were five possible responses ranging from "very much" to "very 
little".  Higher ratings express higher motivation.
2) "If your medical profile was appropriate, would you want to volunteer 
to one of the volunteer units?"  There were four possible responses: 
"absolutely" to "absolutely not", with higher numbers expressing a greater 
desire to volunteer. 
The following table presents the percentage of those answering with the 
two higher categories for motivation to hold a front line position (very 
much and much) and a desire to be in a volunteer unit (absolutely and 
yes). 
Table 36: Motivation to Serve on Front Line by School Type
 Druze  Mixed 
Want a front line position 56% 40% 




The table indicates the following data: 
Both among Druze students in the Druze school and those in the mixed 
school there is a high level of motivation to serve in a front line unit.  
Only 25% were not interested in serving in a front line position or in 
volunteer units (based on those responding with the two most negative 
responses). 
Table 37: Desire to Hold a Front Line Position
Item Average S.D. N 1 2 3 4 5 
Druze 3.59 1.39 50 13 10 21 18 38 
Mixed 3.09 1.31 50 14 21 25 22 18 
P<0.05; t=1.85 
Table 38: Desire to Serve in a Volunteer Unit
Item Average S.D. N 1 2 3 4 
Druze 3.01 1.04 50 14 12 33 41 
Mixed 2.63 0.88 50 14 24 49 13 
P<0.05; t=1.97 
Large differences were discovered between the attitudes of Druze 
students in the different schools regarding motivation to serve in a front 
line unit, in a front line position and volunteer units. 
The Desire to Serve with a  Profession, in the Academic Reserve 
Some students are interested to combine their military service with 
academic studies, and work in a profession that they will learn. 
The respondents were asked:  "Do you intend to join the academic reserve 
(i.e. university studies before military service)"?
The following table presents the percentage of students responding that 
they are interested in the academic reserve (possible answers being 
yes/not interested in serving in the academic reserve). 
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Table 39: Desire to Serve in the Academic Reserve (Percentage)
Item Average S.D. N 1 2 3 4 
Druze 3.23 0.93 50 8 11 31 50 
Mixed 3.10 1.01 50 11 14 30 46 
P<0.05; t=0.68 
The table indicates the following findings: 
There are no significant differences between the desire of Druze students 
in the Druze school and those in the mixed school regarding the issue of 
the their desire to serve with a profession. 
Desire to Become and Officer 
One of the attributes of significant military service for a student is to be 
promoted in the army and to become an officer, along with his desire to 
connect himself to the army for a longer period of time, through a career 
in the military. 
In the research the students were asked two question on this issue: 
1) "If during your service in the IDF you had the opportunity to go to an 
officers' course, would you do it?"  This question had five possible 
categories of response: "I am sure I would: to "I am sure I would not". 
2) "Assume that at the end of your compulsory service you had the 
opportunity to become a career soldier, would you want to?"  This 
question had four possible categories of response: "absolutely yes" to 
"absolutely not". 
The table below presents the rate of students interested in becoming 
officers (combining the two highest responses, "I am sure I would" and "I 
think so"). 
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Table 40: Desire to be an Officer, by School Type
Item Average S.D. N 1 2 3 4 5 
Druze 4.20 1.05 50 2 6 15 21 55 
Mixed 3.96 1.01 50 1 6 26 27 39 
P<0.05; t=1.16 
Approximately 3/4 of the Druze students in the Druze school expressed a 
desire for becoming an officer, versus 2/3 students in the mixed school.  
However, no significant differences were found between the desire of 
Druze students in the Druze school and those in the mixed school 
regarding a desire to become an officer. 
We now examine their degree of desire to serve as a career soldier. 
We examined this issue by type of school.  The following table presents 
the average answers regarding the desire to be a career officer.  Although 
the desire to become an officer was measured with five categories of 
response, willingness to be a career soldier was measured with four 
categories.  A high number expresses a greater desire. 
Table 41: Desire to Serve as a Career Soldier
Item Average S.D. N 1 2 3 4 
Druze 3.06 0.97 50 9 18 33 40 
Mixed 2.76 1.15 50 22 15 30 33 
P<0.05; t=1.41 
There is no significant difference between the desires of the Druze 
students in the Druze school and those in the mixed school regarding the 
desire to serve as a career soldier. 
In summary, regarding motivation to serve in the IDF, we asked a number 
of questions: 
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1. The desire to be recruited. 
2. Willingness to serve in the IDF voluntarily. 
3. Willingness to serve in front line positions. 
4. Desire to serve in volunteer units. 
5. Studying in an officers' course. 
6. Desire to serve as a career soldier. 
Table 42: Comparing Averages and T Values for Druze Students' 
Perceptions (Druze School, Mixed School) Regarding Motivation for IDF
 Type of School 
Motivation to Serve in IDF Druze Mixed T val. Scale
Desire to be recruited 3.11 2.70 2.00* 4 
Willingness to serve in IDF 3.10 2.78 1.98* 4 
Desire to be front line 3.59 3.09 1.85* 5 
Desire to be in volunteer unit 3.01 2.63 1.97* 4 
Officers' course 4.20 3.96 1.16NS 5 
Desire to be career soldier 3.06 2.76 1.41NS 4 
* Significant to at least 0.05 
Examination of the Second Hypothesis
This hypothesis was partially proven.  The Druze students studying in the 
Druze school report a higher level of motivation to serve in the IDF than 
students in the mixed school. 
The hypothesis was supported regarding more military issues and not in 
issues related to social mobility (social status) and job for the future 
(regular work place). 
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Values, Identity and Perception of Democracy 
This section of the paper will examine the values and personal attitudes of 
the Druze students.  This will be examined from the main viewpoints: 
What is important to the Druze students in their lives - personal values. 
The students' Druze values and identity. 
Attitudes regarding democracy. 
Personal Values
1. The students were asked to mark, for 16 subjects, how much 
each one is important and valuable to them. 
2. In addition to examination of the importance of different 
values, the students were asked regarding their degree of 
agreement to a statement regarding willingness to contribute 
in general:  "Don't ask what the State can give me, but rather 
I can give to the State". 
3. The following will present the perceived importance of the 
various values.  The values will be presented in descending 
order of importance (1-16).  The questions had four possible 
categories of response (very important  - not important at 
all), with high numbers expressing more importance.
The data in the following table express the percentage of those who 
responded that the issue was very important.  Rating appears in 
parenthesis, and was determined based on the average for the item. 
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Table 43: Personal Values (Percentage of those responding "Very 
Important")
Value % Important Rating 
Regular job 88 (1) 
Getting a higher education 79 (2) 
Academic achievement 76 (3) 
Financial progress 65 (4) 
Developing and using skills 60 (5) 
Respected social standing 55 (6) 
Having a family 51 (7) 
Working in an interesting profession 47 (8) 
Helping others 46 (9) 
Enjoying life 43 (10) 
Making a lot of money 38 (11) 
Succeeding in the IDF 37 (12) 
Succeeding with my partner 36 (13) 
Contributing to the State 33 (14) 
Participating in public activity 26 (15) 
Going abroad 24 (16) 
Attitudes Towards Democratic Values 
This section examined a number of issues asking the students if they 
should be "increased", "decreased" or "remain the same thing": 
a) Censorship of the media. 
b) Freedom to criticize the government and its policies. 
c) Freedom to strike. 
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The following table presents the responses of the students to these three 
questions.  For ease of presentation the data were grouped into 3 
categories, from the original five.  The data are presented in percentages 
for all respondents: 
Table 44: Attitudes in the Field of Democracy (Percentages)
 Limit Same Increase 
Censorship of media 35% 29% 36% 
Freedom to criticize government 38% 28% 34% 
Freedom to strike 39% 24% 37% 
The table indicates the following findings: 
The attitudes of the Druze students towards this sphere express a clear 
desire for change.  The percent of respondents who would like to keep the 
situation the same in these given areas is low relative to the categories of 
limiting or increasing. 
The Druze students express a clear preference for increasing freedom to 
criticize the government policy, followed by freedom to strike, in second 
place, and then censorship of the media, in last place.  Furthermore, 
differences were found between girls and boys.  Girls preferred increased 
censorship more than boys, and freedom to criticize government policy. 
We then examine the attitudes in the field of democracy by type of 
school. The following table presents the students' attitudes regarding 
democracy.  This scale includes five categories, with high numbers 
expressing more of a desire for an increase in the area. 
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Censorship of the Media 
* Do you think it is necessary to increase, limit or keep the same, the 
following issue: Censorship of the media? 
1. Totally cancel; 2. Limit; 3. No change. 4. Increase;    5. Increase 
greatly. 
Table 45: Distribution of Students' Responses to "Democracy in Israel by 
Type of School
Item Average S.D. N 1 2 3 4 5 
Druze 3.25 1.23 50 9 20 31 19 21 
Mixed 2.81 1.38 50 24 19 25 17 16 
P<0.05; t=1.68 
A significant difference was found between the perceptions of the 
students in the Druze school and those in the mixed school regarding 
censorship of the media. 
When connecting the two categories (4,5) of "increase" and "increase 
greatly", it was found that the students in the Druze school responded 
more highly to this question (40%) than the students in the mixed school 
(33%).  This difference is statistically significant (p<0.05). 
Freedom to Criticize the Government and its Policies 
* Do you think it is necessary to increase, limit or keep the same, the 
following issue: Criticizing the government and its policies? 
1. Totally cancel; 2. Limit; 3. No change. 4. Increase;    5. Increase 
greatly. 
129
Table 46: Distribution of Students' Responses to "Democracy in Israel by 
Type of School
Item Average S.D. N 1 2 3 4 5 
Druze 3.16 1.13 50 6 26 31 22 15 
Mixed 2.78 1.33 50 23 20 25 19 13 
P<0.05; t=1.94 
A significant difference was found between the perceptions of the 
students in the Druze school and those in the mixed school regarding 
freedom to express criticism on the government and its policies.  When 
connecting the two categories (4,5) of "increase" and "increase greatly", it 
was found that the students in the mixed school  responded more highly 
(58%) to the question compared to the students in the Druze school 
(44%).  This difference is statistically significant (p<0.05). 
Freedom to Strike 
* Do you think it is necessary to increase, limit or keep the same, the 
following issue: Freedom to strike? 
1. Totally cancel; 2. Limit; 3. No change. 4. Increase;    5. Increase 
greatly. 
Table 47: Distribution of Students' Responses to "Democracy in Israel by 
Type of School
Item Average S.D. N 1 2 3 4 5 
Druze 3.31 1.40 50 19 8 22 28 23 
Mixed 2.83 1.42 50 27 15 22 21 15 
P<0.05; t=1.94 
A significant difference was found between the perceptions of the 
students  in the  Druze  school  and  those  in the  mixed  school regarding  
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freedom to strike.  When connecting the two categories (4,5) of 
"increase" and "increase greatly", it was found that the students in the 
mixed school  responded more highly (41%) to the question compared to 
the students in the Druze school (29%).  This difference is statistically 
significant (p<0.05). 




















Druse School Mixed School
Youths' National Identity and Connection to the Land 
Examination of the Third Hypothesis
The theoretical chapter surveyed the principles of Druze belief and values 
that Druze youths are raised by, such as reincarnation, belief in fate, etc.   
Belief in these values encourages Druze youth to volunteer and contribute 
to the State, despite risk to one's life.  Therefore the next hypothesis 
examines  if  there is  a correlation between  belief in the  Druze  faith and  
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between the factors of motivation, contribution and volunteering, even at  
risk to life. 
This section first examines national identity of Druze youth, the nature of 
their national identity, and its strength. 
The following table presents the average responses to questions 
concerning "the strength of your feeling as an Israeli", "as a Druze", and 
"as an Arab". The scale runs from 1 to 7, with higher numbers expressing 
a stronger feeling. 
Table 48: National Identity
Strength of Feeling Boys Girls 
As an Israeli 5.58 5.78 
As a Druze 6.19 6.59 
As an Arab 3.69 4.09 
The table indicates the following findings: 
1. The Druze girls express a higher level feeling as Israelis, 
Druze and Arabs, compared to the Druze boys who report a 
lower level of feeling. 
2. The Druze students express a stronger identity with their 
own nation relative to their feelings of being Israeli. 
3. The Druze student express fewer feelings of being Arab, 
compared to their feelings as Druze and Israelis. 
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We examined national identity in an additional fashion, and therefore the 
students were asked if they felt more Israeli, more Druze or more Arab? 
The following table presents the data by percentages. 
Table 49: National Identity by Gender (Percents)
 Boys Girls 
More Israeli 11 20 
The same 17 25 
More Druze 72 55 
The table indicates the following findings: 
The Druze students feel much more like Druze than Israelis.  This finding 
is more obvious among the boys. 
We  asked  the  Druze  students  an  additional  question:  Are  they  more  
similar to Israeli Arabs or to Jews?  52% of the students feel that Druze 
are more similar to Jews. 
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Another aspect of national identity is related to language of choice.  The 
Druze students were asked if they prefer to speak Hebrew, Arabic or both 
languages equally.  The following table presents the data by percentages: 
Table 50: Preferred Language by Gender (Percents)
 Prefer Hebrew The Same Prefer Arabic 
Boys 48 44 8 
Girls 10 62 28 
The table indicates that more than half of the Druze students prefer 
Hebrew and Arabic, but many more boys than girls prefer Hebrew.   
We examined the strength of feeling as an Israeli and a Druze by type of 
school. 
The table presents the average responses.  The scale ran from 1-7 with 
higher numbers expressing a stronger feeling. 
Table 51: Strength of Feeling as an Israeli and Druze, by type of School
 Druze Mixed 
An Israeli 6.11 5.49 
A Druze 6.59 6.21 
The table indicates the following findings: 
In general, the students in the Druze school express a higher feeling of 
being Israeli, relative to the students in the mixed school. 
The students in the Druze school express a higher feeling of being Druze  
Compared to students in the mixed school. 
This pattern of findings is similar to that found when examining the data 
regarding the question:  "Do you perceive yourself first as Israeli or first 
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as Druze"?  This question also found that Druze students perceive 
themselves firstly as Druze and then as Israeli. 
We examined if there was a difference in the strength of feeling Druze, 
Israeli and Arab between the two schools.  The following is the 
distribution of the students' responses regarding Druze identity by type of 
school ("strength of feeling like a Druze"). The scale runs from 1-7 with 
higher numbers expressing a stronger feeling. 
Table 52: Strength of Feeling like Druze, by School
Item Avg. S.D. N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Druze 6.59 1.44 50 5 0 1 1 3 4 86 
Mixed 6.21 1.62 50 7 0 2 3 4 5 79 
P<0.05; t=1.24 
When connecting the three highest categories (7,6,5), a difference was 
found in the strength of feeling Druze between the Druze students in the 
Druze school (93%) and the mixed school (88%).  However, this 
difference was not statistically significant. 
The following is the distribution of the students' responses regarding 
Israeli identity by type of school  ("strength of feeling like an Israeli"). 
The scale runs from 1-7 with higher numbers expressing a stronger 
feeling. 
Table 53: Strength of Feeling like an Israeli, by School
Item Avg. S.D. N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Druze 6.11 1.56 50 5 2 3 3 4 23 61 
Mixed 5.49 2.08 50 9 6 5 7 6 13 54 
P<0.05; t=1.69 
A  significant  difference  was  found  in  the  strength  of  feeling  Israeli, 
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 between Druze students in the Druze school and those in the mixed 
school.  When connecting the three highest categories (7,6,5), a 
difference was found in the strength of feeling Israeli between the Druze 
students in the Druze school (88%) and the mixed school (73%).  This 
difference was  statistically significant (p<0.05).
The following is the distribution of the students' responses regarding Arab 
identity by type of school  ("strength of feeling like an Arab"). The scale 
runs from 1-7 with higher numbers expressing a stronger feeling. 
Table 54: Strength of Feeling like an Arab, by School
Item Avg. S.D. N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Druze 4.04 2.11 50 20 7 10 20 13 10 19 
Mixed 4.46 2.12 50 15 7 7 24 12 7 28 
P<0.05; t=1.33 
When connecting the three highest categories (7,6,5), a difference was 
found in the strength of feeling Arab between the Druze students in the 
Druze school (42%) and the mixed school (47%).  However, this 
difference was not statistically significant. 
We now move on to examine the connection that the youths feel to the 
land of Israel.  The participants in the research were asked directly:  "Are 
you sure you will remain in Israel, i.e., not move permanently to another 
country?" 
The following table presents the average responses by gender (on a five 
category scale, with higher numbers expressing more confidence 
regarding remaining in Israel). 
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The table indicates the following findings: 
Most of the respondents report great confidence that they will remain in 
Israel (over 70% answered in the two highest categories). 
The girls express a bit more confidence in staying in Israel, compared to 
the boys. 
We examined the responses by type of school also.  The following table 
presents the data: 




The table indicates the following findings: 
A relatively high number of  Druze students will consider moving to a 
Druze country if it is created.  The differences between boys and girls is 
not large. 
We examined how satisfied the students were with their Druze Heritage 
studies at both the Druze and the mixed schools. 
* How satisfied are you with your Druze Heritage studies at school? 
1. Very little; 2. Little; 3. Medium. 4. Satisfied;    5. Very satisfied. 
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Table 57: Distribution of Students' Responses Regarding Druze Heritage
Item Average S.D. N 1 2 3 4 5 
Druze 3.75 1.21 50 8 5 28 25 35 
Mixed 3.50 1.32 50 11 10 29 19 31 
P<0.05; t=0.99 
When combining the two categories (4,5), satisfied and very satisfied, a 
difference was found between the students in the Druze school (60%) and 
the students in the mixed school (50%). 
Summary of Values, Identity and Perception of Democracy
The Druze students emphasize academic achievements, higher education 
and respected social status (progress and mobility). 
Contribution to the State and taking part in public activity are rated lower. 
The Druze students express a high level of feeling Israeli.  They express a 
strong identification to their nation (as Druze), relative to their feelings as 
Israelis. 
The Druze student express a relatively weak feeling as Arabs. 
Most of the Druze students express confidence that they will remain in 
Israel. 
The Druze students in the Druze school express a higher level of national 
identity and a stronger connection to Israel relative to the students in the 
mixed school. 
Limiting or expanding freedom for criticizing the government, censorship 
and freedom to strike are related not only to attitudes and values in the 
field of democracy.  We also see that political and religious attitudes 
affect the attitudes of students in these areas. 
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In order to examine our third hypotheses, is there a correlation between 
Druze beliefs and between motivational factors and volunteering for the 
State, we first examined if there was a correlation between the research 
indices in the field of Druze identity, beliefs and values. 
We then examined if there was a correlation between the research indices 
in the field of factors behind motivation and volunteering for the State. 
The following are the inter-correlation calculation results between various 
attitude items regarding Druze identity, beliefs and tradition. 















1.00       
Israeli 
Identity 
**0.37 1.00      
Arab 
Identity 
-0.09 *0.13 1.00     
Reincar-
nation 
**0.22 0.09 -0.06 1.00    
Fate 0.09 0.07 *-0.11 **0.46 1.00   
Traditional  
Lifestyle 




-0.05 0.05 0.04 **0.21 *0.12 *-0.14 1.00 
**p<0.01 *p<0.05 
The table presents the correlations between items of Druze identity and 
values.  We see that Druze identity is correlated positively and 
significantly  with  Israeli  identity  and  belief  in  reincarnation.   
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Furthermore, belief in fate, reincarnation and agreement with a traditional 
lifestyle are positively correlated with one another. 
The following are the inter-correlational calculation results between 
various attitude items regarding recruitment and motivation. 














1.00     
Recruit to 
IDF 
**-0.35 1.00    
Front line 
position 
**-0.31 **0.49 1.00   
Volunteer 
Unit 
**-0.29 **0.27 **0.58 1.00  
Career 
Service 
**-0.28 *0.14 **0.25 *0.18 1.00 
**p<0.01 *p<0.05 
The table presents the correlations between attitude items regarding 
recruitment and motivation.  We see that the attitude items which express 
a positive attitude towards service and motivation were positively 
correlated with one another. 
The following is a table of correlations between various attitude items 
regarding factors behind motivation to serve and Druze identity and 
beliefs. 
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 Table 60: Inter-Correlations Between Attitude Items Regarding 











-0.09 -0.12 *0.14 0.08 0.05 
Recruit to 
IDF 
*0.14 *0.18 *-0.13 -0.04 0.07 
Front line 
position 
*0.13 0.08 *-0.19 0.08 0.06 
Volunteer 
Unit 
0.09 0.17 *-0.14 0.09 0.08 
Career 
Service 
0.09 0.08 0.05 0.03 -0.01 
*p<0.05 
Basically, the system of correlations indicates positive or negative 
correlations as expected.  The attitude items expressing a positive attitude 
towards Druze identity and Druze values were found to be positively 
correlated with one another, and negatively correlated with Arab identity. 
The  attitude items expressing a positive attitude towards military service 
and motivation to serve were, in general, positively correlated with Israeli 
and Druze identity and negatively correlated with Arab identity.  
However, the motivation variables were not significantly correlated with 
the variables of Druze belief. 
A number of correlations are worthy of mention: 
• A high correlation was found between the strength of 
feeling like a Druze and the strength of feeling Israeli 
(0.37).  No correlations were found between feeling like an 
Arab and feeling like a Druze. 
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• Druze identity was positively and significantly correlated 
with recruitment to the IDF and holding a front line 
position, and positively but not significantly correlated with 
volunteering to volunteer units and a desire to become a 
career soldier. 
• Belief in reincarnation was almost significantly positively 
correlated with volunteering to a volunteer unit and holding 
a front line position. 
In summary of the third hypothesis, as we can see from the correlation 
tables: 
1. Druze identity is positively and significantly 
correlated with Israeli identity. 
2. Druze identity is significantly correlated with Druze 
beliefs (reincarnation) and not significantly correlated 
with belief in fate. 
3. Druze identity is positively and significantly 
correlated with some motivational factors (recruitment 
to IDF, volunteering for a front line position), and not 
significantly with some of the motivational factors 
(volunteering, career soldier). 
These findings partially support the third research hypothesis that 
students with a strong Druze identity will volunteer for a front line 
position.  Furthermore, we found partial support for the common opinion 
among the Druze that there is a correlation between keeping principles of 
Druze belief and between volunteering at risk to life. 
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Discussion and Conclusions 
This dissertation addresses the attitudes of Druze youth regarding the 
Israeli-Arab conflict and the peace process, national identity and security.  
Its aim is to examine the attitudes of twelfth grade students regarding 
issues of security, democratic values, and Druze identity and values. 
The present research examines a number of hypotheses regarding 
similarities and areas of difference between two types of schools, a Druze 
school and a mixed school, regarding a number of issues. 
The issues that we chose to examine are issues that are part of the public 
agenda in Israeli society, as the crisis in Israeli democracy and the 
criticism unleashed at the government and its head, after the Second 
Lebanon War; the continuing decades' old conflict with the Palestinians, 
and the question of draft evasion and the decline in the level of 
motivation to serve, have been critical questions which the educational 
system of Israeli deals with daily. 
The First Research Hypothesis 
This hypothesis examines if there is a difference in perceptions of Druze 
students learning in a Druze school and Druze students learning in a 
mixed school regarding the Israeli-Arab conflict and the peace process. 
This hypothesis was partially supported from a statistical standpoint.  It 
was proven for most of the items related to the students' perceptions 
regarding the desires of Israelis and Palestinians for peace.  However, 
apparently, regarding the results of the peace process, the students are 
carefully optimistic, and there is no significant difference between 
students in the two schools. 
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The peace process with the Palestinians has been going on for a long 
time, and each side is convinced that it is doing its best to bring the 
process to final resolution of the conflict, expressed in a final agreement, 
and that the other side is the one putting up barriers to the process.  Each 
side, both Jews and Palestinians, is trying to broadcast that it is more 
interested in peace. 
Gating (1985) addresses two components of the concept of peace, attitude 
towards it and willingness to concede for it.  Attitude towards peace can 
be more or less positive, optimistic or pessimistic, and so can be one's 
degree of willingness to concede and compromise.  The perceptions of 
the Druze students that Israeli Jews show a more positive attitude towards 
peace than the Arabs, is reinforced in the findings of the study by Ichilov 
and Massaway (1994). 
A finding that stands out, is that in most items of the research, the Druze 
students' responses were focused on high or low categories of response, 
which signifies an extreme position.  An explanation for this may be 
found in Olivia's (1972) division of the Druze in Israel.  He divided them 
into three groups, two groups which are the majority and are interested in 
identifying as Israelis, and one third group, the minority, which totally 
identifies with the Arab nation.  This attribute of having an extreme 
attitude among Druze youth can be explained as a behavioral pattern, a 
rebellion and a response to the atmosphere that exists in Druze towns 
after the Second Lebanon War, and direct hits to the population, 
particularly in Majar, which was badly damaged, and fell victim to the 
war. 
The factors which affect perception of the concept of peace, in recent 
years, have  begin to  focus  on  cultural  and  situational  influences  over  
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perception of peace, and this is also true regarding the concept of war and 
conflict (Raviv et al., 1998).  According to Raviv et al., three factors 
affecting the perception of peace in the individual may be discerned: 
1. Historical narrative and social beliefs created as a 
consequence. 
2. The unique situation in which the individual lives.
3. Educational experiences of the individual within society. 
These factors affect the creation of social knowledge in every society, 
including events specific to each society, such as war.  Conflicts are 
strong central experiences which have a decisive impact over society.  
However, every society represents these concepts differently, based on 
their own experiences and specific conditions.  Social beliefs in societies 
in states of conflict develop social beliefs in order to create psychological 
conditions vital for coping better with the conflict (Bar-Tal, 1999).  These 
psychological conditions include dedication to society and the land, high 
motivation to contribute, coping with physical and psychological stress, 
willingness for personal dedication, unity, solidarity, maintaining 
society's aims, perseverance, courage and the ability to suffer.  Social 
behaviors that are acquired and social institutions (educational systems) 
transmit these to members of society, and maintain them.  One of the 
ways schools do this is by formal education: curricula and textbooks.  
When reality changes or it is necessary to prepare for a new reality, there 
is always a need to change curricula and study materials (Firer and 
Eduoan, 1997). 
Regarding the Israeli Palestinian conflict and the peace process currently 
occurring,   the  Israeli   educational  system  and  that  of  the  Palestinian  
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Authority are reorganizing both regarding values and beliefs that have 
been taught to date, and regarding study materials.
Until recently, education in Israel presented different values as spiritual 
guidelines of Israeli society, such as values related to physical strength, 
power, military supremacy, commitment of the individual to the State, 
etc.  Furthermore, the belief that "it is good to die for our country", was 
emphasized (Dagan, 1994).  Slowly, over the years, a number of these 
values have been undermined as a result of a changing reality, the Intifada 
and the Second Lebanon war. Now there is a perceptual change 
occurring.  For example, the existence of the State is possible not only 
through force but also through peaceful methods, accompanied by 
educational experiences which should affect perceptions regarding the 
concept of peace, such as educational curricula regarding peace, 
workshops, meetings between groups in conflicts, activities within the 
schools, and coordination of curricula in Civics and the peace process, 
which is taking place between Israel and the Palestinians. 
The differences between Druse students studying in the Druze school and 
those of students in the mixed school regarding the Israeli-Arab conflict 
and the peace process is explained by their different specific situations 
related to situational factors which have affected their concept of peace in 
different ways.  These explanations are supported by the studies of 
Hakvoort et al., (1998) which found that perception of the concept of 
peace develops within a social and historical context. 
The Second Hypothesis 
The second hypothesis discusses the impact of place (the village) over the 
attitudes of students.  This hypothesis was supported. 
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This hypothesis is based on the social contact theory, positing that 
exposure of Druze students in a mixed school to an Arab population 
(which does not serve in the army) will affect motivation and willingness 
to volunteer and contribute to the State.  Students in mixed villages come 
into social and personal contact with Arabs, maintain communication 
with them, and feel neighborly, socially and culturally.  Apparently the 
sense of discrimination and inequality and exposure to the nationalist 
Arab propaganda by Arab political parties, affects their willingness to 
contribute and volunteer to the State. 
We found differences between the attitudes of Druze students in the 
Druze school and those of Druze students in mixed schools, in all areas 
related to security and military service.  These differences were 
significant regarding their desire to be recruited and to serve in front line 
positions and their desire to volunteer to volunteer units.  We found a 
non-significant difference regarding the desire to become an officer and 
to become a career soldier.  These findings can be explained by the 
degree of closeness and exposure of these students, learning in a mixed 
school, to Arabs who do not serve in the army.  Peres (1976) showed that 
most Arab students in Israel do not identify with the State. 
These differences between attitudes of Druze students in the Druze school 
and in the mixed school, are a result of different outlooks among the 
students themselves.  The students in the Druze school express more 
positive attitudes towards service than students in the mixed school.  If 
we compare this with the studies of Jack (1975), Hoffman (1972) and 
Smooha (1976), they found that among Arabs, Arab identity is in first 
place.  In  the  present study,  among the  Druze  students,  it was  in  third  
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place, ranked very much lower than Druze and Israeli identity.  We found 
that about 73% of the students in the Druze school express a desire to be 
drafted into the army, versus 53% in the mixed school.  About 65% of the 
students in the Druze school are highly motivated to serve in front line 
positions, versus 51% of the students in the mixed school. 
Amir (1968) found that inter-ethnic contact will lead to solidarity and 
understanding between ethnic groups.  The students in the mixed school 
are in daily contact with the Arab public, and have good relations 
between  members of their town, going to common events, celebrations, 
funerals, etc., developing solidarity and understanding. 
One of the research questions at the foundation of this study, which is 
very important to Druze leadership in Israel is: How do Druze students 
define the components of their identity and is there a difference between 
the identity of Druze students in a Druze school and that of students in a 
mixed school?  The research data indicated the existence of three clear 
components involved in perception of Druze identity. 
1. The religious ethnic component. 
2. The Israeli citizenship component. 
3. The Arab cultural component. 
The students were asked to rate their identity on a seven point scale, and 
the first definition that they provided for their identity was the religious 
ethnic component, which stood out in first place.  The civil Israeli 
component stood out in second place.  The third, Arab cultural 
component was not strongly emphasized by most of the students, and 
generally received a low rating. 
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The clearness of these three components of identity among the students 
testifies to the fact that the students maintain multiple identities.  The 
professional literature addresses the connection between maintaining 
multiple cultural identities and between quality of life, indicating that 
understanding the situation of an individual coping with multiple cultural 
identities can lead to two possible predictions (Ben Shalom and 
Hornchik, 2000):  On one hand, it may be hypothesized that maintaining 
one identity at the expense of the others, prevents conflict and therefore 
contributes to the individual's sense of well-being.  On the other hand, 
maintaining a number of group identities, which the individual sees 
positively, may be a source for social, cultural and material resources.  
Additional studies have indicated that a consolidated cultural identity is 
important in order for minorities to adapt (Phinney, 1995), unlike others 
who have seen the connection between a certain cultural identity and 
between adaptation (Epstein & Levin, 1996). 
The research data testify that the frequency of the religious ethnic 
component was the most dominant, strong and obvious among most of 
the students in both schools, among all three identity components. This 
component of Druze identity was not found to be different among the 
Druze students in the Druze school and the mixed school.  On the other 
hand, in the civilian Israeli component part of the Druze students' identity 
definition, there was a significant difference between the Druze students 
in the Druze school and the mixed school.  The students in the Druze 
school identified more with the State, and felt the State was a homeland 
and nation.  Druze heritage also reinforces this perception regarding the 
State by indicating a number of countries which can be considered a 
homeland, one  of which  is Israel,  compared to the Druze students in the  
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mixed school, who are under the impact of Arab students, most of whom 
do not consider Israel as their State and are discriminated against in 
development of common tows for Arabs and Druze. 
In the cultural-Arabic component as a component,  this is not 
consolidated among the Druze students, and their treatment of it is mainly 
cognitive.  Belonging to Arab culture stems from the language that they 
speak, which is considered their mother tongue, and the fact that their 
written religious works are in Arabic.  Druze heritage is also learned in 
that language.  There is no nationalistic component to this element 
(Hutnik, 1991). 
The Arabic cultural component in Druze identity is considered to be a 
problematic component by the Druze students, because there is a certain 
difficulty among the students regarding defining their Arab cultural 
identity.  This difficulty stems from the need to include social personality 
and cultural aspects in one concept, whereas these aspects are often not in 
keeping with one another.  Many students do not feel any Arabic cultural 
connection in their identity.  What is important among these students is 
the religious component, which explains the lack of feeling belonging to 
the Arab culture in their identity, as this component is perceived as a 
problem.  Arabic as a language is not enough to make them feel cultural 
belonging, because the Druze religion is different than other Arab 
religions and the Arabic concept is perceived in terms of Palestinians, 
Moslems and Christians. 
Alhaj (1997) addressed this problem in defining identity among the 
Druze.  He posits that the source of this problem involves the fact that the 
Druze sect in Israel has chosen ethnic particularism, cultivating and 
encouraging government in this way (Oppenheimer, 1978). 
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The Third Hypothesis 
This hypothesis examined the correlation between maintaining the 
principles of Druze belief and between contribution and volunteering at 
risk of life.  When examining this hypothesis, we compared between 
identity items and Druze values, and between motivational factors to 
serve.  Our hypothesis was that the stronger one's Druze beliefs, the 
higher motivation will be to serve in the IDF.  This hypothesis was 
partially proven only.  We found that there is a positive correlation 
between Druze identity and between Druze beliefs (reincarnation, fate), 
and between Druze identity and motivational factors (front line positions, 
volunteering in volunteer units). 
However, we did not find any direct correlation between Druze beliefs 
and motivational factors.  We expected that in light of the common belief 
within the Druze community - belief in fate and reincarnation, this would 
encourage Druze youths to volunteer for dangerous life threatening tasks, 
and that a correlation would be found between components of Druze 
belief and motivational factors.  The principles of Druze belief direct 
Druze youths toward accepting the will of God.  According to this 
principle the Druze trust the supreme power and accept their fate out of a 
belief that it has been preordained from birth.  As a result of their belief in 
reincarnation, and the soul moving from one body to another without 
dying, the Druze youth is not afraid of risking his life, and thus serving in 
front line units is typical. 
The explanation for the fact that our hypothesis was not fully supported:  
A correlation was found between Druze beliefs and motivation to 
volunteer   in  volunteer  units.  Motivation  to  serve  in a  front  line  unit  
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creates social status, because in Israel and in the Druze sect, a military 
career is a high status symbol, paving the way to receiving an important 
role in the county and high respected social standing in the community. 
We find that 92% of the respondents in this study noted that they believe 
in the principles of Druze faith. This fact does not allow distribution over 
this variable, and therefore there is no correlation with the motivational 
variable. 
We see that the present research and its findings are important, and 
recommends further research in the field in order to learn about the 
perceptions of Druze students regarding military service, the identity 
component and Druze values. 
1. Examining the process of identity development of the 
Druze student in Israel, and the impact of the 
components of identity over his future behavior. 
2. Reexamination of the contents of the Druze Heritage 
curriculum and teaching Druze values to students. 
3. Changing government policies and using a policy of 
"remedial discrimination" towards the Druze in Israel 
in order to achieve full equality. 
4. A long term study to examine if a change occurs in 
Druze youths' opinions towards the IDF and state 
security before and after military service. 
5. Examination of the role of the Druze school in 
teaching democratic and Druze values to its students. 
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